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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2024 16:14:45 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTF=-Sh6w4icTPA_=A25-EL55Nt-z=mvyb1-vONoN=5wg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] security changes for v6.9-rc3
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, 
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>, 
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 1:38=E2=80=AFPM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission=
com> wrote:
> Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> writes:
>
> > I know it's everyone's favorite hobby to bash the LSM and LSM devs,
> > but it's important to note that we don't add hooks without working
> > with the associated subsystem devs to get approval.
>
> Hah!!!!
>
> > In the cases
> > where we don't get an explicit ACK, there is an on-list approval, or
> > several ignored on-list attempts over weeks/months/years.  We want to
> > be good neighbors.
>
> Hah!!!!
>
> You merged a LSM hook that is only good for breaking chrome's sandbox,
> over my expressed objections.  After I tested and verified that
> is what it does.
>
> I asked for testing. None was done.  It was claimed that no
> security sensitive code would ever fail to check and deal with
> all return codes, so no testing was necessary.  Then later a
> whole bunch of security sensitive code that didn't was found.
>
> The only redeeming grace has been that no-one ever actually uses
> that misbegotten security hook.
>
> P.S.  Sorry for this off topic rant but sheesh.   At least from
> my perspective you deserve plenty of bashing.

Just in case people are reading this email and don't recall the
security_create_user_ns() hook discussions from 2022, I would suggest
reading those old threads and drawing your own conclusions.  A lore
link is below:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/?q=3Ds%3Asecurity_create_user=
_ns

--=20
paul-moore.com