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Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 15:42:32 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed
Message-ID: <20240412224232.uiaht6yx2ghtx3gg@desk>
References: <cover.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
 <079f24edefb5b47e922c2804f199463e04ccf0c8.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
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In-Reply-To: <079f24edefb5b47e922c2804f199463e04ccf0c8.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 11:10:32AM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 3c7434329661..7c87fe80c696 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -470,6 +470,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL		(21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW	(21*32+ 3) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT (21*32+ 4) /* "" Clear branch history at vmexit using SW loop */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_SAFE	(21*32+ 4) /* "" Indirect branches aren't vulnerable to Spectre v2 */

This should be (21*32+ 5).

Other than that:

Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>