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Message-ID: <b702b36b90b63b615d41e778570707043ea81551.camel@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH] firmware: dmi: Stop decoding on broken entry
From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
To: Michael Schierl <schierlm@gmx.de>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael
 Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 17:33:32 +0200
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If a DMI table entry is shorter than 4 bytes, it is invalid. Due to
how DMI table parsing works, it is impossible to safely recover from
such an error, so we have to stop decoding the table.

Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/Zh2K3-HLXOesT_vZ@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2/T/
---
Michael, can you please test this patch and confirm that it prevents
the early oops?

The root cause of the DMI table corruption still needs to be
investigated.

 drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- linux-6.8.orig/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
+++ linux-6.8/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
@@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ static void dmi_decode_table(u8 *buf,
 		const struct dmi_header *dm = (const struct dmi_header *)data;
 
 		/*
+		 * If a short entry is found (less than 4 bytes), not only it
+		 * is invalid, but we cannot reliably locate the next entry.
+		 */
+		if (dm->length < sizeof(struct dmi_header)) {
+			pr_warn(FW_BUG
+				"Corrupted DMI table (only %d entries processed)\n",
+				i);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
 		 *  We want to know the total length (formatted area and
 		 *  strings) before decoding to make sure we won't run off the
 		 *  table in dmi_decode or dmi_string

-- 
Jean Delvare
SUSE L3 Support