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Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 10:57:23 -0700
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed
Message-ID: <20240417175723.r4si62d6oqirqadb@treble>
References: <eda0ec65f4612cc66875aaf76e738643f41fbc01.1713296762.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
 <dad3a832-b3d0-4c72-a9f1-1ec4e6bc6bba@citrix.com>
 <20240417164514.66hgypzxgqxt3ssk@desk>
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In-Reply-To: <20240417164514.66hgypzxgqxt3ssk@desk>

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 09:45:14AM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 04:14:26PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > On 17/04/2024 12:02 am, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > > index ca295b0c1eee..dcb97cc2758f 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > > @@ -1678,6 +1687,21 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> > >  	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
> > >  	enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
> > >  
> > > +	/*
> > > +	 * X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_SAFE indicates whether indirect calls can be
> > > +	 * considered safe.  That means either:
> > > +	 *
> > > +	 *   - the CPU isn't vulnerable to Spectre v2 or its variants;
> > > +	 *
> > > +	 *   - a hardware mitigation is in place (e.g., IBRS, BHI_DIS_S); or
> > > +	 *
> > > +	 *   - the user turned off mitigations altogether.
> > > +	 *
> > > +	 * Assume innocence until proven guilty: set the cap bit now, then
> > > +	 * clear it later if/when needed.
> > > +	 */
> > > +	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_SAFE);
> > 
> > Following on from the (re)discovery that X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE is a poor
> > name given what it *actually* does, can I recommend s/SAFE/OK/ here?
> 
> Or simply X86_FEATURE_USE_INDIRECT_BRANCH.
> 
> > This flag really is "do I want indirect branches or not", which - as
> > noted here - is more than just a judgement of whether indirect branches
> > are "safe".

X86_FEATURE_USE_INDIRECT_BRANCH sounds good.  It's a bit long but does
describe it better.

-- 
Josh