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h=Date:To:From:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: Feedback-ID:From:To:Cc:Date:Subject:Reply-To:Feedback-ID: Message-ID:BIMI-Selector; b=QU97x+Q+uDPS0SdkO6EHo/RbHvPmEyCBeePZ9HCFVsz+d6ZrRGSMKl1sxvqgJkBbk reD8jB2hChO4rck/EVbn0IoXWbMLDtr9/6a8trMM3uGa0zm0k6yMpEliBg+ZhyKJ9b fy2WGKzcP28AAQzv2mzmTHCuabUlD/8AZZZh23GgYJfh3WnrjGCfOEnOkpVZdFEMz6 w5AVy6PV1yxwikPO6S81SBVeDXE13wEzeEVf1pV9QzekcZQFLasv1UAWENmtMoTDCM xiSxsPW7++PhSAQvhJPQcKTtg1fPdA7/kxS67tENUIkJ/DwSTrVI8WxbSVesWTuKNt ZijcbRKnfvXbQ== Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 19:24:31 +0000 To: Boqun Feng From: Benno Lossin Cc: Alice Ryhl , Miguel Ojeda , Matthew Wilcox , Al Viro , Andrew Morton , Kees Cook , Alex Gaynor , Wedson Almeida Filho , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?Q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Greg Kroah-Hartman , =?utf-8?Q?Arve_Hj=C3=B8nnev=C3=A5g?= , Todd Kjos , Martijn Coenen , Joel Fernandes , Carlos Llamas , Suren Baghdasaryan , Arnd Bergmann , Trevor Gross , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Christian Brauner Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 4/4] rust: add abstraction for `struct page` Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: <20240418-alice-mm-v6-0-cb8f3e5d688f@google.com> <20240418-alice-mm-v6-4-cb8f3e5d688f@google.com> <87dc4cdf-ccf6-4b08-8915-313aad313f93@proton.me> <079c88af-2e6d-45fe-bf58-afebbf7583b4@proton.me> Feedback-ID: 71780778:user:proton X-Pm-Message-ID: 99067a81dd80b83b29b9214a862a2f3e3d937d32 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 19.04.24 19:23, Boqun Feng wrote: > On Fri, Apr 19, 2024 at 08:36:11AM +0000, Benno Lossin wrote: >> On 19.04.24 01:04, Boqun Feng wrote: >>> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 03:56:11PM -0700, Boqun Feng wrote: >>>> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 10:08:40PM +0000, Benno Lossin wrote: >>>>> On 18.04.24 20:52, Boqun Feng wrote: >>>>>> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 08:59:20AM +0000, Alice Ryhl wrote: >>>>>>> + /// Runs a piece of code with a raw pointer to a slice of this= page, with bounds checking. >>>>>>> + /// >>>>>>> + /// If `f` is called, then it will be called with a pointer th= at points at `off` bytes into the >>>>>>> + /// page, and the pointer will be valid for at least `len` byt= es. The pointer is only valid on >>>>>>> + /// this task, as this method uses a local mapping. >>>>>>> + /// >>>>>>> + /// If `off` and `len` refers to a region outside of this page= , then this method returns >>>>>>> + /// `EINVAL` and does not call `f`. >>>>>>> + /// >>>>>>> + /// # Using the raw pointer >>>>>>> + /// >>>>>>> + /// It is up to the caller to use the provided raw pointer cor= rectly. The pointer is valid for >>>>>>> + /// `len` bytes and for the duration in which the closure is c= alled. The pointer might only be >>>>>>> + /// mapped on the current thread, and when that is the case, d= ereferencing it on other threads >>>>>>> + /// is UB. Other than that, the usual rules for dereferencing = a raw pointer apply: don't cause >>>>>>> + /// data races, the memory may be uninitialized, and so on. >>>>>>> + /// >>>>>>> + /// If multiple threads map the same page at the same time, th= en they may reference with >>>>>>> + /// different addresses. However, even if the addresses are di= fferent, the underlying memory is >>>>>>> + /// still the same for these purposes (e.g., it's still a data= race if they both write to the >>>>>>> + /// same underlying byte at the same time). >>>>>>> + fn with_pointer_into_page( >>>>>>> + &self, >>>>>>> + off: usize, >>>>>>> + len: usize, >>>>>>> + f: impl FnOnce(*mut u8) -> Result, >>>>>> >>>>>> I wonder whether the way to go here is making this function signatur= e: >>>>>> >>>>>> fn with_slice_in_page ( >>>>>> &self, >>>>>> =09 off: usize, >>>>>> =09 len: usize, >>>>>> =09 f: iml FnOnce(&UnsafeCell<[u8]>) -> Result >>>>>> ) -> Result >>>>>> >>>>>> , because in this way, it makes a bit more clear that what memory th= at >>>>>> `f` can access, in other words, the users are less likely to use the >>>>>> pointer in a wrong way. >>>>>> >>>>>> But that depends on whether `&UnsafeCell<[u8]>` is the correct >>>>>> abstraction and the ecosystem around it: for example, I feel like th= ese >>>>>> two functions: >>>>>> >>>>>> =09 fn len(slice: &UnsafeCell<[u8]>) -> usize >>>>>> =09 fn as_ptr(slice: &UnsafeCell<[u8]>) -> *mut u8 >>>>>> >>>>>> should be trivially safe, but I might be wrong. Again this is just f= or >>>>>> future discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I think the "better" type would be `&[UnsafeCell]`. Since there y= ou >>>>> can always access the length. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Hmm.. here is the thing, having `&UnsafeCell<[u8]>` means having a `*m= ut >>>> [u8]>`, and it should always be safe to get a "length" of `*mut [u8]`, >>>> right? I haven't found any method doing that, but the length should be >>>> just a part of fat pointer, so I think getting that is a defined >>>> behavior. But maybe I'm missing something. >> >> There is `to_raw_parts` [1], but that is unstable. (Note that >> `<[T] as Pointee>::Metadata =3D usize`, see [2]) >> >=20 > Oh, that's good to know, thank you! ;-) > >>> Hmm... but I guess one of the problems of this approach, is how to >>> construct a `&UnsafeCell<[u8]>` from a pointer and length... >> >> We could use `from_raw_parts` [3]. But when making the slice the outer >> type, we can use a stable function to convert a pointer and a length to >> a slice [4]. >> >=20 > Yes, but there appears no way to get a pointer with larger provenance > from a `&[UnsafeCell]`, right? What do you mean by "larger provenance"? >>>>> Another question would be if page allows for uninitialized bits, in t= hat >>>>> case, we would need `&[Opaque]`. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, or `&Opaque<[u8>]`. >> >> I don't think that putting the slice on the inside is what we want. Also >=20 > Hmm.. why? So in `&UnsafeCell<[u8]>` vs `&[UnsafeCell]` case, I > think the former represent "a slice of u8 that can be modified in the > same time" very well, and this is what a pointer-and-length pair usually > represents in kernel, I think. But yes, the latter is OK to me as well, > just hard to play the provenance game I guess? Ultimately it again comes down to missing field projections :) The type `&UnsafeCell<[u8]>` is less *useful*, since you cannot even get the length of the slice. Also indexing into this type is not easily possible. This is because the only way to get/change the inner value of an `UnsafeCell` is via `get`. Compare this with the slice type. It allows getting the length, indexing into it (ie a form of field projections, if we consider slices as having a variable amount of fields). All those issues would be solved by (good) field projections. Field projections also give a reason for why using `&[UnsafeCell]` is not really different from `&UnsafeCell<[u8]>`: At any point in time we ought to be able to project `&UnsafeCell<[u8]> -> &[UnsafeCell]`. So it's fine to just use that from the get-go. >> note that `Opaque` requires that `T: Sized` and that is not the case >> for `[u8]`. >=20 > Oh, you're right. In case of MaybeUninit, it requires `T: Sized`, so > `Opaque<[u8]>` doesn't quite work. >=20 > Moving forward, maybe the first step is to see whether `&[Opaque]` > and `&[UnsafeCell]` can have a good way to generate a pointer with > proper provenance? Time to ping t-opsem maybe? Good idea, do you want to do that, or should I do it? --=20 Cheers, Benno