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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
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	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Maksim Davydov <davydov-max@yandex-team.ru>
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:09:51 -0700
Message-ID: <72d86c6da24138f39ca6fc9459b1d037301c1427.1713559768.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
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In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit
mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable.  Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_v2=auto option which was removed with
the following commit:

  36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and
is disabled by default.

Requested-by: Maksim Davydov <davydov-max@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 16 +++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 902ecd92a29f..83c4889b88d2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -6069,9 +6069,15 @@
 			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
 			clearing sequence.
 
-			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
-			       as needed.
-			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+			on     - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+				 needed.  This protects the kernel from
+				 both syscalls and VMs.
+			vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation
+				 available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit
+				 ONLY.  On such systems, the host kernel is
+				 protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but
+				 may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks.
+			off    - Disable the mitigation.
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5fca46c78daf..575a4bb5a78d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)
 enum bhi_mitigations {
 	BHI_MITIGATION_OFF,
 	BHI_MITIGATION_ON,
+	BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
 };
 
 static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
 	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit"))
+		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
 	else
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
 
@@ -1659,6 +1662,7 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 			return;
 	}
 
+	/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
 	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
 		return;
 
@@ -1671,13 +1675,15 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 	 */
 	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_BRANCH_OK);
 
-	/* Mitigate KVM by default */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
+	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY) {
+		pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
+		return;
+	}
 
-	/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */
+	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n");
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP);
-	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n");
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
 }
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
-- 
2.44.0