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Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 14:21:18 -0500
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] PCI: Relabel JHL6540 on Lenovo X1 Carbon 7,8
To: Esther Shimanovich <eshimanovich@chromium.org>,
 Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
 Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>, Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
 linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
 Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
References: <ZalOCPrVA52wyFfv@google.com>
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From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
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On 4/22/2024 14:17, Esther Shimanovich wrote:
> Thanks for the explanation! I still don't fully understand how that
> would work for my use case.
> 
> Perhaps it would be better for me to describe the case I am trying to
> protect against.
> 
> To rehash, this quirk was written for devices with discrete
> Thunderbolt controllers.
> 
> For example,
> CometLake_CPU -> AlpineRidge_Chip -> USB-C Port
> This device has the ExternalFacingPort property in ACPI.
> My quirk relabels the Alpine Ridge chip as "fixed" and
> external-facing, so that devices attached to the USB-C port could be
> labeled as "removable"
> 
> Let's say we have a TigerLake CPU, which has integrated
> Thunderbolt/USB4 capabilities:
> 
> TigerLake_ThunderboltCPU -> USB-C Port
> This device also has the ExternalFacingPort property in ACPI and lacks
> the usb4-host-interface property in the ACPI.
> 
> My worry is that someone could take an Alpine Ridge Chip Thunderbolt
> Dock and attach it to the TigerLake CPU
> 
> TigerLake_ThunderboltCPU -> USB-C Port -> AlpineRidge_Dock
> 
> If that were to happen, this quirk would incorrectly label the Alpine
> Ridge Dock as "fixed" instead of "removable".
> 
> My thinking was that we could prevent this scenario from occurring if
> we filtered this quirk not to apply on CPU's like Tiger Lake, with
> integrated Thunderbolt/USB4 capabilities.
> 
> ExternalFacingPort is found both on the Comet Lake ACPI and also on
> the Tiger Lake ACPI. So I can't use that to distinguish between CPUs
> which don't have integrated Thunderbolt, like Comet Lake, and CPUs
> with integrated Thunderbolt, like Tiger Lake.
> 
> I am looking for something that can tell me if the device's Root Port
> has the Thunderbolt controller upstream to it or not.
> Is there anything like that?
> Or perhaps should I add a check which compares the name of the
> device's CPU with a list of CPUs that this quirk can be applied to?
> Or is there some way I can identify the Thunderbolt controller, then
> determine if it's upstream or downstream from the root port?
> Or are Alpine Ridge docks not something to worry about at all?

My thought was once you have a device as untrusted, everything else 
connected to it should "also" be untrusted.