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From: Stas Sergeev <stsp2@yandex.ru>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stas Sergeev <stsp2@yandex.ru>,
	Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>,
	Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	=?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fs: reorganize path_openat()
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 13:52:47 +0300
Message-ID: <20240424105248.189032-2-stsp2@yandex.ru>
In-Reply-To: <20240424105248.189032-1-stsp2@yandex.ru>
References: <20240424105248.189032-1-stsp2@yandex.ru>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This patch moves the call to alloc_empty_file() below the call to
path_init(). That changes is needed for the next patch, which adds
a cred override for alloc_empty_file(). The needed cred info is only
available after the call to path_init().

No functional changes are intended by that patch.

Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp2@yandex.ru>

CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
 fs/namei.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index c5b2a25be7d0..413eef134234 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3781,23 +3781,30 @@ static struct file *path_openat(struct nameidata *nd,
 {
 	struct file *file;
 	int error;
+	u64 open_flags = op->open_flag;
 
-	file = alloc_empty_file(op->open_flag, current_cred());
-	if (IS_ERR(file))
-		return file;
-
-	if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
-		error = do_tmpfile(nd, flags, op, file);
-	} else if (unlikely(file->f_flags & O_PATH)) {
-		error = do_o_path(nd, flags, file);
+	if (unlikely(open_flags & (__O_TMPFILE | O_PATH))) {
+		file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
+		if (IS_ERR(file))
+			return file;
+		if (open_flags & __O_TMPFILE)
+			error = do_tmpfile(nd, flags, op, file);
+		else
+			error = do_o_path(nd, flags, file);
 	} else {
 		const char *s = path_init(nd, flags);
-		while (!(error = link_path_walk(s, nd)) &&
-		       (s = open_last_lookups(nd, file, op)) != NULL)
-			;
+		file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
+		error = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(file);
+		if (!error) {
+			while (!(error = link_path_walk(s, nd)) &&
+			       (s = open_last_lookups(nd, file, op)) != NULL)
+				;
+		}
 		if (!error)
 			error = do_open(nd, file, op);
 		terminate_walk(nd);
+		if (IS_ERR(file))
+			return file;
 	}
 	if (likely(!error)) {
 		if (likely(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))
-- 
2.44.0