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From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 14:21:39 -0700
Message-ID: <CAJuCfpGiRFAOp-aqpVk6GRpG=4LEF3XyuV_LijzwDYRHKqHWWg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] alloc_tag: Tighten file permissions on /proc/allocinfo
To: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@kvack.org, 
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
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On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 2:04=E2=80=AFPM Kent Overstreet
<kent.overstreet@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 09:51:56PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 04:45:51PM -0400, Kent Overstreet wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 01:08:50PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > The /proc/allocinfo file exposes a tremendous about of information =
about
> > > > kernel build details, memory allocations (obviously), and potential=
ly
> > > > even image layout (due to ordering). As this is intended to be cons=
umed
> > > > by system owners (like /proc/slabinfo), use the same file permissio=
ns as
> > > > there: 0400.
> > >
> > > Err...
> > >
> > > The side effect of locking down more and more reporting interfaces is
> > > that programs that consume those interfaces now have to run as root.
> >
> > sudo cat /proc/allocinfo | analyse-that-fie
>
> Even that is still an annoyance, but I'm thinking more about a future
> daemon to collect this every n seconds - that really shouldn't need to
> be root.

Yeah, that would preclude some nice usecases. Could we maybe use
CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks instead? That way we can still use it from a
non-root process?

>
> And the "lock everything down" approach really feels like paranoia gone
> too far - what's next, /proc/cpuinfo? Do we really want to go the
> Windows approach of UAC pop ups for everything? I'd rather be going the
> opposite direction, of making it as easy as possible for users to see
> what's going on with their machine.
>
> Instead, why not a sysctl, like we already have for perf?
>
> The concern about leaking image layout could be addressed by sorting the
> output before returning to userspace.