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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	=?UTF-8?q?Thomas=20Wei=C3=9Fschuh?= <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] stackleak: don't modify ctl_table argument
Date: Fri,  3 May 2024 12:35:48 -0700
Message-Id: <171476494554.2457276.4385338995352491886.b4-ty@chromium.org>
In-Reply-To: <20240503-sysctl-const-stackleak-v1-1-603fecb19170@weissschuh.net>
References: <20240503-sysctl-const-stackleak-v1-1-603fecb19170@weissschuh.net>
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On Fri, 03 May 2024 15:44:09 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> Sysctl handlers are not supposed to modify the ctl_table passed to them.
> Adapt the logic to work with a temporary
> variable, similar to how it is done in other parts of the kernel.
> 
> This is also a prerequisite to enforce the immutability of the argument
> through the callbacks prototy.
> 
> [...]

Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!

[1/1] stackleak: don't modify ctl_table argument
      https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/0e148d3cca0d

Take care,

-- 
Kees Cook