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Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 16:34:44 +0300
From: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
To: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@redhat.com>, 
	Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>, Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@collabora.com>, 
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	"T.J. Mercier" <tjmercier@google.com>, Christian =?utf-8?B?S8O2bmln?= <christian.koenig@amd.com>, 
	Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>, Robert Mader <robert.mader@collabora.com>, 
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	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>, 
	Milan Zamazal <mzamazal@redhat.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andrey.konovalov.ynk@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Safety of opening up /dev/dma_heap/* to physically present users
 (udev uaccess tag) ?
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On Mon, May 06, 2024 at 04:01:42PM +0200, Hans de Goede wrote:
> Hi Sima,
> 
> On 5/6/24 3:38 PM, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> > On Mon, May 06, 2024 at 02:05:12PM +0200, Maxime Ripard wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> On Mon, May 06, 2024 at 01:49:17PM GMT, Hans de Goede wrote:
> >>> Hi dma-buf maintainers, et.al.,
> >>>
> >>> Various people have been working on making complex/MIPI cameras work OOTB
> >>> with mainline Linux kernels and an opensource userspace stack.
> >>>
> >>> The generic solution adds a software ISP (for Debayering and 3A) to
> >>> libcamera. Libcamera's API guarantees that buffers handed to applications
> >>> using it are dma-bufs so that these can be passed to e.g. a video encoder.
> >>>
> >>> In order to meet this API guarantee the libcamera software ISP allocates
> >>> dma-bufs from userspace through one of the /dev/dma_heap/* heaps. For
> >>> the Fedora COPR repo for the PoC of this:
> >>> https://hansdegoede.dreamwidth.org/28153.html
> >>
> >> For the record, we're also considering using them for ARM KMS devices,
> >> so it would be better if the solution wasn't only considering v4l2
> >> devices.
> >>
> >>> I have added a simple udev rule to give physically present users access
> >>> to the dma_heap-s:
> >>>
> >>> KERNEL=="system", SUBSYSTEM=="dma_heap", TAG+="uaccess"
> >>>
> >>> (and on Rasperry Pi devices any users in the video group get access)
> >>>
> >>> This was just a quick fix for the PoC. Now that we are ready to move out
> >>> of the PoC phase and start actually integrating this into distributions
> >>> the question becomes if this is an acceptable solution; or if we need some
> >>> other way to deal with this ?
> >>>
> >>> Specifically the question is if this will have any negative security
> >>> implications? I can certainly see this being used to do some sort of
> >>> denial of service attack on the system (1). This is especially true for
> >>> the cma heap which generally speaking is a limited resource.
> >>
> >> There's plenty of other ways to exhaust CMA, like allocating too much
> >> KMS or v4l2 buffers. I'm not sure we should consider dma-heaps
> >> differently than those if it's part of our threat model.
> > 
> > So generally for an arm soc where your display needs cma, your render node
> > doesn't. And user applications only have access to the later, while only
> > the compositor gets a kms fd through logind. At least in drm aside from
> > vc4 there's really no render driver that just gives you access to cma and
> > allows you to exhaust that, you need to be a compositor with drm master
> > access to the display.
> > 
> > Which means we're mostly protected against bad applications, and that's
> > not a threat the "user physically sits in front of the machine accounts
> > for", and which giving cma access to everyone would open up. And with
> > flathub/snaps/... this is very much an issue.
> 
> I agree that bad applications are an issue, but not for the flathub / snaps
> case. Flatpacks / snaps run sandboxed and don't have access to a full /dev
> so those should not be able to open /dev/dma_heap/* independent of
> the ACLs on /dev/dma_heap/*. The plan is for cameras using the
> libcamera software ISP to always be accessed through pipewire and
> the camera portal, so in this case pipewere is taking the place of
> the compositor in your kms vs render node example.
> 
> So this reduces the problem to bad apps packaged by regular distributions
> and if any of those misbehave the distros should fix that.
> 
> So I think that for the denial of service side allowing physical
> present users (but not sandboxed apps running as those users) to
> access /dev/dma_heap/* should be ok.

What about an app built by the user? The machines can still be
multi-seat or have multiple users.

> My bigger worry is if dma_heap (u)dma-bufs can be abused in other
> ways then causing a denial of service.
> 
> I guess that the answer there is that causing other security issues
> should not be possible ?
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Hans
> 

-- 
With best wishes
Dmitry