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From: Yusong Gao <a869920004@gmail.com>
To: jarkko@kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
	eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com,
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Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	trivial@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] integrity: Update comment for load_moklist_certs()
Date: Sat, 11 May 2024 03:22:24 +0000
Message-Id: <20240511032224.818418-1-a869920004@gmail.com>
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After commit 45fcd5e521cd ("integrity: add new keyring handler for
mok keys"), the comment about load_moklist_certs() is out-of-date.
Change keyring name from platform to machine.

Signed-off-by: Yusong Gao <a869920004@gmail.com>
---
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index d1fdd113450a..e954776d3cfb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
  * load_moklist_certs() - Load MokList certs
  *
  * Load the certs contained in the UEFI MokListRT database into the
- * platform trusted keyring.
+ * machine keyring.
  *
  * This routine checks the EFI MOK config table first. If and only if
  * that fails, this routine uses the MokListRT ordinary UEFI variable.
-- 
2.34.1