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From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net>
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References: <20240516092213.6799-1-jcalmels@3xx0.net>
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Date: Fri, 17 May 2024 09:22:23 -0500
In-Reply-To: <xv52m5xu5tgwpckkcvyjvefbvockmb7g7fvhlky5yjs2i2jhsp@dcuovgkys4eh>
	(Jonathan Calmels's message of "Fri, 17 May 2024 04:55:03 -0700")
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] capabilities: user namespace capabilities

Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net> writes:

> On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 06:32:46AM GMT, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> 
>> Pointers please?
>> 
>> That sentence sounds about 5 years out of date.
>
> The link referenced is from last year.
> Here are some others often cited by distributions:
>
> https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0185
> https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1015
> https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2078
> https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24122
> https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636
>
> Recent thread discussing this too:
> https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2024/q2/128

My apologies perhaps I trimmed too much.

I know that user namespaces enlarge the attack surface.
How much and how serious could be debated but for unprivileged
users the attack surface is undoubtedly enlarged.

As I read your introduction you were justifying the introduction
of a new security mechanism with the observation that distributions
were carrying distribution specific patches.

To the best of my knowledge distribution specific patches and
distributions disabling user namespaces have been gone for quite a
while.  So if that has changed recently I would like to know.

Thank you,
Eric