Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-191014-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1 as permitted sender) client-ip=2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1;
From: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl>
To: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem@amazon.com>
Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>,
	Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>,
	Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl>,
	linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] gpio: prevent potential speculation leaks in gpio_device_get_desc()
Date: Mon, 27 May 2024 16:51:51 +0200
Message-ID: <171682150857.156397.13252252218897228306.b4-ty@linaro.org>
In-Reply-To: <20240523085332.1801-1-hagarhem@amazon.com>
References: <20240523085332.1801-1-hagarhem@amazon.com>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>


On Thu, 23 May 2024 08:53:32 +0000, Hagar Hemdan wrote:
> Userspace may trigger a speculative read of an address outside the gpio
> descriptor array.
> Users can do that by calling gpio_ioctl() with an offset out of range.
> Offset is copied from user and then used as an array index to get
> the gpio descriptor without sanitization in gpio_device_get_desc().
> 
> This change ensures that the offset is sanitized by using
> array_index_nospec() to mitigate any possibility of speculative
> information leaks.
> 
> [...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] gpio: prevent potential speculation leaks in gpio_device_get_desc()
      commit: d795848ecce24a75dfd46481aee066ae6fe39775

Best regards,
-- 
Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>