Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S935898AbYBCGCF (ORCPT ); Sun, 3 Feb 2008 01:02:05 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751656AbYBCGBy (ORCPT ); Sun, 3 Feb 2008 01:01:54 -0500 Received: from twinlark.arctic.org ([208.69.40.136]:58402 "EHLO twinlark.arctic.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751378AbYBCGBx (ORCPT ); Sun, 3 Feb 2008 01:01:53 -0500 Message-ID: <47A558CF.60702@kernel.org> Date: Sat, 02 Feb 2008 22:01:51 -0800 From: "Andrew G. Morgan" User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (X11/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Andrew Morton CC: Linux Security Modules List , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" Subject: Re: [PATCH] per-process securebits References: <47A2D439.9050704@kernel.org> <20080201002837.d84fc029.akpm@linux-foundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20080201002837.d84fc029.akpm@linux-foundation.org> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1877 Lines: 55 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Andrew Morton wrote: | On Fri, 01 Feb 2008 00:11:37 -0800 "Andrew G. Morgan" wrote: | |> [This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |> is enabled at configure time.] | | Patches like this scare the pants off me. Nice to know I'm not being mediocre! :-D | I'd have to recommend that distributors not enable this feature (if we | merge it) until they have 100% convinced themselves that it is 100% | correct. FWIW I'm in complete agreement if you are referring to CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES and not just this patch... As to the rest, the short version: * The sendmail thing was a subtle problem trying to map setuid(non-0) into a capability framework. The long and the short of it was that an unprivileged user could prevent a privileged application from exercising all of the privilege it needed and getting root access as a result. * I'm saying setuid(0) apps will most definitely continue to be supported by a kernel even with CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y. All the patch does is make it possible for a capable(CAP_SETPCAP) process to declare itself as the parent of a process tree in which that is not the case. Here is the very very long version (which took some time to write, and I thought was a bit much to spam these lists with): http://userweb.kernel.org/~morgan/sendmail-capabilities-war-story.html Cheers Andrew -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFHpVjP+bHCR3gb8jsRAsMtAJ9XqR0yaeY8O3F8/nCdoALPksKZOQCg06/7 pJOZRfMORnI8YfIcta5nVLw= =Rpj4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/