Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-194856-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 147.75.199.223 as permitted sender) client-ip=147.75.199.223;
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <1716583609-21790-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> <1716583609-21790-16-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
In-Reply-To: <1716583609-21790-16-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 21:46:57 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRsnGjZATBj7-evK6Gdryr54raTTKMYO_vup8AGXLwjQg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in
 signatures to LSMs
To: ebiggers@kernel.org, Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, 
	tytso@mit.edu, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, 
	mpatocka@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, 
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, 
	fsverity@lists.linux.dev, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, 
	dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, 
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 4:46=E2=80=AFPM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> =
wrote:
>
> This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
> authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
> signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
> e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
> files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
> a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
> control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
> could be established to permit the execution of all files with verified
> built-in fsverity signatures while restricting kernel module loading
> from specified fsverity files via fsverity digests.
>
> The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
> fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a fil=
e
> is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity fil=
es
> that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
> subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
> signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
> crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
> effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
> stack interactions.
>
> The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
> documentation in fsverity.rst.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> ---
> v1-v6:
>   + Not present
>
> v7:
>   Introduced
>
> v8:
>   + Split fs/verity/ changes and security/ changes into separate patches
>   + Change signature of fsverity_create_info to accept non-const inode
>   + Change signature of fsverity_verify_signature to accept non-const ino=
de
>   + Don't cast-away const from inode.
>   + Digest functionality dropped in favor of:
>     ("fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected
>       file digest")
>   + Reworded commit description and title to match changes.
>   + Fix a bug wherein no LSM implements the particular fsverity @name
>     (or LSM is disabled), and returns -EOPNOTSUPP, causing errors.
>
> v9:
>   + No changes
>
> v10:
>   + Rename the signature blob key
>   + Cleanup redundant code
>   + Make the hook call depends on CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
>
> v11:
>   + No changes
>
> v12:
>   + Add constification to the hook call
>
> v13:
>   + No changes
>
> v14:
>   + Add doc/comment to built-in signature verification
>
> v15:
>   + Add more docs related to IPE
>   + Switch the hook call to security_inode_setintegrity()
>
> v16:
>   + Explicitly mention "fsverity builtin signatures" in the commit
>     message
>   + Amend documentation in fsverity.rst
>   + Fix format issue
>   + Change enum name
>
> v17:
>   + Fix various documentation issues
>   + Use new enum name LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID
>
> v18:
>   + Fix typos
>   + Move the inode_setintegrity hook call into fsverity_verify_signature(=
)
>
> v19:
>   + Cleanup code w.r.t inode_setintegrity hook refactoring
> ---
>  Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
>  fs/verity/signature.c                  | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
>  include/linux/security.h               |  1 +
>  3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Eric, can you give this patch in particular a look to make sure you
are okay with everything?  I believe Fan has addressed all of your
previous comments and it would be nice to have your Ack/Review tag if
you are okay with the current revision.

--=20
paul-moore.com