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Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 18:06:18 +0800
From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>,
	Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Staudt <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
	Daniel P =?iso-8859-1?Q?=2E_Berrang=E9?= <berrange@redhat.com>,
	Kairui Song <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
	Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
	Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing
 LUKS volume keys
Message-ID: <ZmLbmriQYol2JHKe@MiWiFi-R3L-srv>
References: <20240523050451.788754-1-coxu@redhat.com>
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In-Reply-To: <20240523050451.788754-1-coxu@redhat.com>

Hi Coiby,

On 05/23/24 at 01:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
> LUKS is the standard for Linux disk encryption. Many users choose LUKS
> and in some use cases like Confidential VM it's mandated. With kdump
> enabled, when the 1st kernel crashes, the system could boot into the
> kdump/crash kernel and dump the memory image i.e. /proc/vmcore to a
> specified target. Currently, when dumping vmcore to a LUKS
> encrypted device, there are two problems,

I am done with this round of reviewing. The overall approach looks good
to me, while there are places to improve or fix. I have added comment on
all things I am concerned about, please check. Thanks for the effort.

By the way, do you get confirmation on the solution from encryption/keys
developer of redhat internally or upstream? With my understanding, it
looks good. It may need their confirmation or approval in some ways.

Thanks
Baoquan