Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1765434AbYBMP3d (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Feb 2008 10:29:33 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756292AbYBMP3Z (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Feb 2008 10:29:25 -0500 Received: from mx2.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.151.9]:34210 "EHLO mx2.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753622AbYBMP3Y (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Feb 2008 10:29:24 -0500 Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 16:29:00 +0100 From: Ingo Molnar To: pageexec@freemail.hu Cc: Sam Ravnborg , Arjan van de Ven , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: vmsplice exploits, stack protector and Makefiles Message-ID: <20080213152900.GA28959@elte.hu> References: <20080212090001.3fcc4ca0@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <47B30F05.29637.9A21F9B@pageexec.freemail.hu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <47B30F05.29637.9A21F9B@pageexec.freemail.hu> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.17 (2007-11-01) X-ELTE-VirusStatus: clean X-ELTE-SpamScore: -1.5 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-1.5 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.2.3 -1.5 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1554 Lines: 42 * pageexec@freemail.hu wrote: > patches to get CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL actually to work (it > includes the Makefile patch proposed in this thread already). > > note that the fix to ACPI is an actual stack corruption bug (caught by > ssp thanks to a lucky stack layout), due to the misuse of the pci > accessor functions, probably a whole-tree audit is in order for > similar bugs. > > note also that the vsyscall functions (more precisely, all the code > that goes into .vsyscall* sections) had better be separated into their > own .c files so that they can be compiled without -mcmodel=kernel and > use %fs for getting the ssp cookie, if ssp is desired at all there). thanks, i've picked up your patch into x86.git#mm and also made stackprotector-all default-enabled so that we get more test coverage of this critical security feature. x86.git#mm can be picked up via: http://people.redhat.com/mingo/x86.git/README head of the tree: ----------------> commit e1d96d3e489d02b12984fb3c755b0f9a9ae0fe5f Author: Ingo Molnar Date: Wed Feb 13 16:15:34 2008 +0100 x86: enable stack-protector by default also enable the rodata and nx tests. <---------------- your patch booted fine here with stackprotector-all enabled. Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/