Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756541AbYBNRB3 (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Feb 2008 12:01:29 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751850AbYBNRBW (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Feb 2008 12:01:22 -0500 Received: from mx2.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.151.9]:53915 "EHLO mx2.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751669AbYBNRBV (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Feb 2008 12:01:21 -0500 Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2008 18:00:58 +0100 From: Ingo Molnar To: pageexec@freemail.hu Cc: Sam Ravnborg , Arjan van de Ven , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, Thomas Gleixner , "H. Peter Anvin" Subject: [x86.git#mm] stack protector fixes, vmsplice exploit Message-ID: <20080214170058.GA2043@elte.hu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.17 (2007-11-01) X-ELTE-VirusStatus: clean X-ELTE-SpamScore: -1.5 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-1.5 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.2.3 -1.5 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1576 Lines: 38 update: latest x86.git#mm has a pretty much working stack-protector feature - you can pick it up for testing via: http://people.redhat.com/mingo/x86.git/README as pageexec@freemail.hu has indicated it already in his analysis and patch, there were multiple bugs hitting us here. The amount and scope of these problems show structural problems in how security in this area was approached. So with these changes we try to go deeper than just minimally fixing the feature. We've got 15 changes so far in and around this area: x86: fix execve with -fstack-protect x86: exclude vsyscall files from stackprotect x86: fix stackprotect Makefile rule x86: fix stackprotector canary updates during context switches panic: print more informative messages on stackprotect failure panic: print out stacktrace if DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE x86: enable stack-protector by default x86: setup stack canary for the idle threads x86: fix canary of the boot CPU's idle task stackprotector: include files stackprotector: add boot_init_stack_canary() x86: fix the stackprotector canary of the boot CPU x86: stackprotector: mix TSC to the boot canary x86: test the presence of the stackprotector x86: streamline stackprotector but we've not completed this work yet. We'll push the independent bits to Linus ASAP. Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/