Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754105AbYBSFGu (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Feb 2008 00:06:50 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750736AbYBSFGk (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Feb 2008 00:06:40 -0500 Received: from smtp124.plus.mail.sp1.yahoo.com ([69.147.95.87]:36873 "HELO smtp124.plus.mail.sp1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with SMTP id S1750759AbYBSFGj (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Feb 2008 00:06:39 -0500 X-YMail-OSG: 490WV_QVM1mbmDsGlDvfEIYPPd2bfAW14kedm1VOxWijchwAz5tdSwt7mEYamZ3b0xY4dOFgnwVrF2Of2SK3FdLpyrt5fbDnNmRTXLKpG0wHRwybBQ-- X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 Message-ID: <47BA1BAE.6020001@schaufler-ca.com> Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2008 15:58:38 -0800 From: Casey Schaufler Reply-To: casey@schaufler-ca.com User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.9 (Windows/20071031) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, serue@us.ibm.com, morgan@kernel.org CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] [RFC] Smack update for file capabilities Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4556 Lines: 151 From: Casey Schaufler This patch assumes "Smack unlabeled outgoing ambient packets - v4" which is one reason it's RFC. Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module" as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based capabilities. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap//Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap/security/smack/smack_lsm.c linux-2.6.25-g0216/security/smack/smack_lsm.c --- linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap/security/smack/smack_lsm.c 2008-02-18 10:53:45.000000000 -0800 +++ linux-2.6.25-g0216/security/smack/smack_lsm.c 2008-02-18 14:15:25.000000000 -0800 @@ -584,6 +584,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vf static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags) { + int rc; + + rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || @@ -658,6 +664,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct d */ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) { + int rc; + + rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; @@ -1016,7 +1028,12 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct t */ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1028,7 +1045,12 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct tas */ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1053,7 +1075,12 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct t static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1093,6 +1120,11 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; /* * Special cases where signals really ought to go through * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may @@ -1778,6 +1810,27 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct k return smk_curacc(isp, may); } +/* module stacking operations */ + +/** + * smack_register_security - stack capability module + * @name: module name + * @ops: module operations - ignored + * + * Allow the capability module to register. + */ +static int smack_register_security(const char *name, + struct security_operations *ops) +{ + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", + __func__, name); + + return 0; +} + /** * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode * @opt_dentry: unused @@ -2412,6 +2465,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr, .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr, .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr, + .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, + .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity, .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity, .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity, @@ -2471,6 +2526,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, + .register_security = smack_register_security, + .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate, .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr, -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/