Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757435AbYBYUHU (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Feb 2008 15:07:20 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1755775AbYBYUHI (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Feb 2008 15:07:08 -0500 Received: from x346.tv-sign.ru ([89.108.83.215]:54503 "EHLO mail.screens.ru" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755345AbYBYUHG (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Feb 2008 15:07:06 -0500 Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2008 23:03:28 +0300 From: Oleg Nesterov To: Stephen Smalley Cc: Andrew Morton , Casey Schaufler , David Quigley , "Eric W. Biederman" , Eric Paris , Harald Welte , Pavel Emelyanov , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] kill_pid_info_as_uid: don't use security_task_kill() Message-ID: <20080225200328.GA83@tv-sign.ru> References: <20080225174228.GA22084@tv-sign.ru> <1203965042.2804.196.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1203965042.2804.196.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1810 Lines: 45 On 02/25, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Mon, 2008-02-25 at 20:42 +0300, Oleg Nesterov wrote: > > kill_pid_info_as_uid() is solely used by drivers/usb/core/. The original > > "[PATCH] Fix signal sending in usbdevio on async URB completion" commit > > 46113830a18847cff8da73005e57bc49c2f95a56 was right, but nowadays we use > > struct pid and this solves most of the addressed problems. > > > > It would be nice to use kill_pid_info() instead, but we can't because USB > > uses .si_code = SI_ASYNCIO which fools SI_FROMUSER() and thus security checks. > > > > I think we should omit the permission checks completely, the task which does > > ioctl(USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB) explicitly asks to send the signal to it, we should > > not deny the signal even if the task changes its credentials in any way. > > If we are applying checks based on uid/gid to protect suid/sgid > programs, then we ought to also invoke the LSM hook to allow protection > of other credential-changing transformations, like SELinux context > transitions. You either remove all checking or none, please. Yes, you are right. I'd like to remove all uid/euid checks. This patch doesn't do this because - perhaps it will be possible to kill this helper - if we remove these checks, we should do some subsequent cleanups in drivers/usb/core/, while this series is all about LSM hooks. I am going to do this later. > And if all, what's the rationale? I think it is not good that LSM has some special (and unneeded!) hacks for USB. Please also look at the next patch. Do you agree? Oleg. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/