Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934548AbYCFQMv (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Mar 2008 11:12:51 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S933885AbYCFQMf (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Mar 2008 11:12:35 -0500 Received: from nf-out-0910.google.com ([64.233.182.189]:23925 "EHLO nf-out-0910.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933867AbYCFQMb (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Mar 2008 11:12:31 -0500 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=date:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version:content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent:from; b=Q9DLiZnXFGqNcWGVdA8FSfFM3WJFNf9CcRLYUd+G6blmsCKdkdebAPAV2XOwKckoFGXLKCnIevPilXVrPajgdDVYoo2LMM8VPk9dNCLbiV2CQo4J4s/XZdhBwhKh8RWRLlVbPZl9b+oQImSFhMdErn6/au68frexqItqUnQ7tCQ= Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 18:09:10 +0200 To: James Morris Cc: Chris Wright , Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris , Casey Schaufler , Paul Moore , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Linus , LKML , LSM-ML Subject: [PATCH -v8b -rc3] Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Message-ID: <20080306160910.GA10319@ubuntu> References: <20080306121913.GA8506@ubuntu> <1865922a0803060632kb63405fj3d255472fb2e555f@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.15+20070412 (2007-04-11) From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 9391 Lines: 290 Hi, [ Thanks James for all those helpful comments since patch-v1!. - Remove spinlocks since we've dictated to use security_module_enable() under kernel init path only (__init). ] --> Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +++++ include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++++++ security/dummy.c | 4 ++- security/security.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++++++ security/smack/smack.h | 2 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +++++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 11 +++++++++- 8 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 9a5b665..64efbdc 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -374,6 +374,12 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file possible to determine what the correct size should be. This option provides an override for these situations. + security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot. + If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first + security module asking for security registration will be + loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated + as if no module has been chosen. + capability.disable= [SECURITY] Disable capabilities. This would normally be used only if an alternative security model is to be diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index fe52cde..801c9ad 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ extern unsigned securebits; +/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ +#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 + struct ctl_table; /* @@ -117,6 +120,12 @@ struct request_sock; /** * struct security_operations - main security structure * + * Security module identifier. + * + * @name: + * A string that acts as a unique identifeir for the LSM with max number + * of characters = SECURITY_NAME_MAX. + * * Security hooks for program execution operations. * * @bprm_alloc_security: @@ -1207,6 +1216,8 @@ struct request_sock; * This is the main security structure. */ struct security_operations { + char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; + int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct * parent, struct task_struct * child); int (*capget) (struct task_struct * target, kernel_cap_t * effective, @@ -1466,6 +1477,7 @@ struct security_operations { /* prototypes */ extern int security_init (void); +extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops); extern int register_security (struct security_operations *ops); extern int mod_reg_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops); extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode, diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 649326b..b668fda 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -979,7 +979,9 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ -struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; +struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = { + .name = "dummy", +}; #define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \ do { \ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d15e56c..8d67e73 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ #include #include +/* Boot-time LSM user choice */ +static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; /* things that live in dummy.c */ extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; @@ -67,13 +69,47 @@ int __init security_init(void) return 0; } +/* Save user chosen LSM */ +static int __init choose_lsm(char *str) +{ + strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); + return 1; +} +__setup("security=", choose_lsm); + +/** + * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ? + * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked. + * + * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations + * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used + * to check if your LSM is currently loaded. + * + * Return true if: + * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time, + * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask + * for registeration permissoin, + * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded. + * Otherwise, return false. + */ +int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops) +{ + if (!*chosen_lsm) + strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); + else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /** * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered * * This function is to allow a security module to register itself with the * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops - * value passed to this function. + * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM + * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops). * * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel, * an error will be returned. Otherwise 0 is returned on success. diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 75c2e99..49709a4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5219,6 +5219,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, #endif static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { + .name = "selinux", + .ptrace = selinux_ptrace, .capget = selinux_capget, .capset_check = selinux_capset_check, @@ -5405,6 +5407,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; + if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { + selinux_enabled = 0; + return 0; + } + if (!selinux_enabled) { printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); return 0; diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index a21a0e9..c444f48 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include /* @@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_star; extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset; extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list; +extern struct security_operations smack_ops; /* * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation. diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 770eb06..afa7967 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2433,7 +2433,9 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } -static struct security_operations smack_ops = { +struct security_operations smack_ops = { + .name = "smack", + .ptrace = smack_ptrace, .capget = cap_capget, .capset_check = cap_capset_check, @@ -2566,6 +2568,9 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = { */ static __init int smack_init(void) { + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + return 0; + printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n"); /* diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 358c92c..effd3de 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -986,12 +986,21 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount; * * register the smackfs * - * Returns 0 unless the registration fails. + * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled + * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the + * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get + * initialized before the vfs caches. + * + * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if + * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded. */ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) { int err; + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + return 0; + err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type); if (!err) { smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type); -- "Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness" Ahmed S. Darwish Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/