Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1765417AbYCGTzm (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Mar 2008 14:55:42 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1762087AbYCGTzG (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Mar 2008 14:55:06 -0500 Received: from zombie.ncsc.mil ([144.51.88.131]:55385 "EHLO zombie.ncsc.mil" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1761592AbYCGTzF (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Mar 2008 14:55:05 -0500 Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup From: Stephen Smalley To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Casey Schaufler , Greg KH , Pavel Emelyanov , Andrew Morton , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, menage@google.com, sukadev@us.ibm.com In-Reply-To: <20080307183052.GB3898@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <20080307173542.GA2552@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <757539.74589.qm@web36608.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20080307183052.GB3898@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain Organization: National Security Agency Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 14:46:12 -0500 Message-Id: <1204919172.1397.541.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.12.3 (2.12.3-1.fc8) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1326 Lines: 38 On Fri, 2008-03-07 at 12:30 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com): > > > > --- "Serge E. Hallyn" wrote: > > > > > ... > > > > > > Until user namespaces are complete, selinux seems the only good solution > > > to offer isolation. > > > > Smack does it better and cheaper. (Unless you define good==selinux) > > (insert smiley) > > Ah, thanks - I hadn't looked into it, but yes IIUC smack should > definately work. I'll have to give that a shot. Not if you want to confine uid 0. smack doesn't control capabilities, even the ones used to override it. So you'd have to at least configure your per-process bset and file caps rather carefully. And even then you have to watch out for things with CAP_MAC* or CAP_SETPCAP. > (A basic selinux policy module to isolate a container was pretty simple, > but providing finer-grained intra-container access seems to take some > changes to the base refpolicy. I've been waiting a few weeks to find > time to work on that.) -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/