Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753477AbYCSTZx (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 15:25:53 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752866AbYCSTYk (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 15:24:40 -0400 Received: from proxy3.bredband.net ([195.54.101.73]:42723 "EHLO proxy3.bredband.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752613AbYCSTYa (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Mar 2008 15:24:30 -0400 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvdDANfV4EfVchQtPGdsb2JhbACBWo8fAQEBATABmQ8 Message-ID: <56260.192.168.101.12.1205942454.squirrel@intranet> In-Reply-To: <20080318165610.GA5914@sergelap.ibm.com> References: <20080318165610.GA5914@sergelap.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 17:00:54 +0100 (CET) Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] cgroups: implement device whitelist (v5) From: "Daniel Hokka Zakrisson" To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "lkml" , "Stephen Smalley" , "Greg KH" , "Li Zefan" , "Casey Schaufler" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "Linux Containers" , "Paul Menage" , "Pavel Emelianov" User-Agent: SquirrelMail/1.4.10a-1.fc6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Importance: Normal Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 21852 Lines: 801 Hi Serge, Some minor nits in the patch. Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > This version differs from v4 only in that it addresses Li Zefan's comments > on > v4. > > Implement a cgroup to track and enforce open and mknod restrictions on > device > files. A device cgroup associates a device access whitelist with each > cgroup. A whitelist entry has 4 fields. 'type' is a (all), c (char), or > b (block). 'all' means it applies to all types and all major and minor > numbers. Major and minor are either an integer or * for all. > Access is a composition of r (read), w (write), and m (mknod). > > The root device cgroup starts with rwm to 'all'. A child devcg gets > a copy of the parent. Admins can then remove devices from the > whitelist or add new entries. A child cgroup can never receive a > device access which is denied its parent. However when a device > access is removed from a parent it will not also be removed from the > child(ren). > > An entry is added using devices.allow, and removed using > devices.deny. For instance > > echo 'c 1:3 mr' > /cgroups/1/devices.allow > > allows cgroup 1 to read and mknod the device usually known as > /dev/null. Doing > > echo a > /cgroups/1/devices.deny > > will remove the default 'a *:* mrw' entry. > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to change permissions or move another task > to a new cgroup. A cgroup may not be granted more permissions than > the cgroup's parent has. Any task can move itself between cgroups. > This won't be sufficient, but we can decide the best way to > adequately restrict movement later. > > Changelog: > Mar 18 2008: Address comments by Li Zefan. > Mar 17 2008: Place specific device cgroup hooks next to > security_inode_{mknod,permission} rather than using > the security hooks. > Also remove most of the controls over tasks moving > between cgroups and playing with the allow and deny > permissions. > Mar 13 2008: move the dev_cgroup support into > capability hooks instead of having it > as a separate security module. > Support root_plug with devcg. > Note that due to this change, devcg will > not be enforcing if the dummy module is > loaded, or if selinux is loaded without > capabilities. > Mar 12 2008: allow dev_cgroup lsm to be used when > SECURITY=n, and allow stacking with SELinux > and Smack. Don't work too hard in Kconfig > to prevent a warning when smack+devcg are > both compiled in, worry about that later. > > Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn > Acked-by: James Morris > Looks-good-to: Pavel Emelyanov > :) > --- > fs/namei.c | 9 + > include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h | 6 + > include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 12 + > init/Kconfig | 7 + > security/Makefile | 1 + > security/device_cgroup.c | 598 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 633 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/linux/device_cgroup.h > create mode 100644 security/device_cgroup.c > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index dfb3cb8..6caed32 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > > @@ -281,6 +282,10 @@ int permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct > nameidata *nd) > if (retval) > return retval; > > + retval = devcgroup_inode_permission(inode, mask); > + if (retval) > + return retval; > + > return security_inode_permission(inode, mask, nd); > } > > @@ -2028,6 +2033,10 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry > *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) > if (!dir->i_op || !dir->i_op->mknod) > return -EPERM; > > + error = devcgroup_inode_mknod(mode, dev); > + if (error) > + return error; > + > error = security_inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); > if (error) > return error; > diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h b/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h > index 1ddebfc..e287745 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h > +++ b/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h > @@ -42,3 +42,9 @@ SUBSYS(mem_cgroup) > #endif > > /* */ > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE > +SUBSYS(devices) > +#endif > + > +/* */ > diff --git a/include/linux/device_cgroup.h b/include/linux/device_cgroup.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..0b0d9c3 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/linux/device_cgroup.h > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > +#include > +#include > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE > +extern int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); > +extern int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev); > +#else > +static inline int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int > mask) > +{ return 0; } > +static inline int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) > +{ return 0; } > +#endif > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig > index 009f2d8..30868cd 100644 > --- a/init/Kconfig > +++ b/init/Kconfig > @@ -298,6 +298,13 @@ config CGROUP_NS > for instance virtual servers and checkpoint/restart > jobs. > > +config CGROUP_DEVICE > + bool "Device controller for cgroups" > + depends on CGROUPS && EXPERIMENTAL > + help > + Provides a cgroup implementing whitelists for devices which > + a process in the cgroup can mknod or open. > + > config CPUSETS > bool "Cpuset support" > depends on SMP && CGROUPS > diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile > index 9e8b025..7ef1107 100644 > --- a/security/Makefile > +++ b/security/Makefile > @@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += commoncap.o smack/built-in.o > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += commoncap.o root_plug.o > +obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o > diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..63d9099 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c > @@ -0,0 +1,598 @@ > +/* > + * dev_cgroup.c - device cgroup subsystem > + * > + * Copyright 2007 IBM Corp > + */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#define ACC_MKNOD 1 > +#define ACC_READ 2 > +#define ACC_WRITE 4 > +#define ACC_MASK (ACC_MKNOD | ACC_READ | ACC_WRITE) > + > +#define DEV_BLOCK 1 > +#define DEV_CHAR 2 > +#define DEV_ALL 4 /* this represents all devices */ > + > +/* > + * whitelist locking rules: > + * cgroup_lock() cannot be taken under dev_cgroup->lock. > + * dev_cgroup->lock can be taken with or without cgroup_lock(). > + * > + * modifications always require cgroup_lock > + * modifications to a list which is visible require the > + * dev_cgroup->lock *and* cgroup_lock() > + * walking the list requires dev_cgroup->lock or cgroup_lock(). > + * > + * reasoning: dev_whitelist_copy() needs to kmalloc, so needs > + * a mutex, which the cgroup_lock() is. Since modifying > + * a visible list requires both locks, either lock can be > + * taken for walking the list. > + */ > + > +struct dev_whitelist_item { > + u32 major, minor; > + short type; > + short access; > + struct list_head list; > +}; > + > +struct dev_cgroup { > + struct cgroup_subsys_state css; > + struct list_head whitelist; > + spinlock_t lock; > +}; > + > +static inline struct dev_cgroup *cgroup_to_devcgroup( > + struct cgroup *cgroup) > +{ > + return container_of(cgroup_subsys_state(cgroup, devices_subsys_id), > + struct dev_cgroup, css); > +} > + > + > +struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys; > + > +static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, > + struct cgroup *new_cgroup, struct task_struct *task) > +{ > + if (current != task && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * called under cgroup_lock() > + */ > +static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head > *orig) > +{ > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp, *new; > + > + list_for_each_entry(wh, orig, list) { > + new = kmalloc(sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!new) > + goto free_and_exit; > + new->major = wh->major; > + new->minor = wh->minor; > + new->type = wh->type; > + new->access = wh->access; > + list_add_tail(&new->list, dest); > + } > + > + return 0; > + > +free_and_exit: > + list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, dest, list) { > + list_del(&wh->list); > + kfree(wh); > + } > + return -ENOMEM; > +} > + > +/* Stupid prototype - don't bother combining existing entries */ > +/* > + * called under cgroup_lock() > + * since the list is visible to other tasks, we need the spinlock also > + */ > +static int dev_whitelist_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) > +{ > + struct dev_whitelist_item *whcopy; > + > + whcopy = kmalloc(sizeof(*whcopy), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!whcopy) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + memcpy(whcopy, wh, sizeof(*whcopy)); > + spin_lock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + list_add_tail(&whcopy->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist); > + spin_unlock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * called under cgroup_lock() > + * since the list is visible to other tasks, we need the spinlock also > + */ > +static void dev_whitelist_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) > +{ > + struct dev_whitelist_item *walk, *tmp; > + > + spin_lock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { > + if (walk->type == DEV_ALL) > + goto remove; > + if (walk->type != wh->type) > + continue; > + if (walk->major != ~0 && walk->major != wh->major) > + continue; > + if (walk->minor != ~0 && walk->minor != wh->minor) > + continue; > + > +remove: > + walk->access &= ~wh->access; > + if (!walk->access) { > + list_del(&walk->list); > + kfree(walk); > + } > + } > + spin_unlock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > +} > + > +/* > + * called from kernel/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held. > + */ > +static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup_subsys > *ss, > + struct cgroup *cgroup) > +{ > + struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, *parent_dev_cgroup; > + struct cgroup *parent_cgroup; > + int ret; > + > + dev_cgroup = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!dev_cgroup) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->whitelist); > + parent_cgroup = cgroup->parent; > + > + if (parent_cgroup == NULL) { > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; > + wh = kmalloc(sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!wh) { > + kfree(dev_cgroup); > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + } > + wh->minor = wh->major = ~0; > + wh->type = DEV_ALL; > + wh->access = ACC_MKNOD | ACC_READ | ACC_WRITE; > + list_add(&wh->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist); > + } else { > + parent_dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(parent_cgroup); > + ret = dev_whitelist_copy(&dev_cgroup->whitelist, > + &parent_dev_cgroup->whitelist); > + if (ret) { > + kfree(dev_cgroup); > + return ERR_PTR(ret); > + } > + } > + > + spin_lock_init(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + return &dev_cgroup->css; > +} > + > +static void devcgroup_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, > + struct cgroup *cgroup) > +{ > + struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp; > + > + dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { > + list_del(&wh->list); > + kfree(wh); > + } > + kfree(dev_cgroup); > +} > + > +#define DEVCG_ALLOW 1 > +#define DEVCG_DENY 2 > + > +static void set_access(char *acc, short access) > +{ > + int idx = 0; > + memset(acc, 0, 4); > + if (access & ACC_READ) > + acc[idx++] = 'r'; > + if (access & ACC_WRITE) > + acc[idx++] = 'w'; > + if (access & ACC_MKNOD) > + acc[idx++] = 'm'; > +} > + > +static char type_to_char(short type) > +{ > + if (type == DEV_ALL) > + return 'a'; > + if (type == DEV_CHAR) > + return 'c'; > + if (type == DEV_BLOCK) > + return 'b'; > + return 'X'; > +} > + > +static void set_majmin(char *str, int len, unsigned m) > +{ > + memset(str, 0, len); > + if (m == ~0) > + sprintf(str, "*"); > + else > + snprintf(str, len, "%d", m); > +} > + > +static char *print_whitelist(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, int *len) > +{ > + char *buf, *s, acc[4]; > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; > + int ret; > + int count = 0; > + char maj[10], min[10]; > + > + buf = kmalloc(4096, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buf) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + s = buf; > + *s = '\0'; > + *len = 0; > + > + spin_lock(&devcgroup->lock); > + list_for_each_entry(wh, &devcgroup->whitelist, list) { > + set_access(acc, wh->access); > + set_majmin(maj, 10, wh->major); > + set_majmin(min, 10, wh->minor); > + ret = snprintf(s, 4095-(s-buf), "%c %s:%s %s\n", > + type_to_char(wh->type), maj, min, acc); > + if (s+ret >= buf+4095) { > + kfree(buf); > + buf = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + break; > + } > + s += ret; > + *len += ret; > + count++; > + } > + spin_unlock(&devcgroup->lock); > + > + return buf; > +} > + > +static ssize_t devcgroup_access_read(struct cgroup *cgroup, > + struct cftype *cft, struct file *file, > + char __user *userbuf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); > + int filetype = cft->private; > + char *buffer; > + int len, retval; > + > + if (filetype != DEVCG_ALLOW) > + return -EINVAL; > + buffer = print_whitelist(devcgroup, &len); > + if (IS_ERR(buffer)) > + return PTR_ERR(buffer); > + > + retval = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, nbytes, ppos, buffer, len); > + kfree(buffer); > + return retval; > +} > + > +/* > + * may_access_whitelist: > + * does the access granted to dev_cgroup c contain the access > + * requested in whitelist item refwh. > + * return 1 if yes, 0 if no. > + * call with c->lock held > + */ > +static int may_access_whitelist(struct dev_cgroup *c, > + struct dev_whitelist_item *refwh) > +{ > + struct dev_whitelist_item *whitem; > + > + list_for_each_entry(whitem, &c->whitelist, list) { > + if (whitem->type & DEV_ALL) > + return 1; > + if ((refwh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(whitem->type & DEV_BLOCK)) > + continue; > + if ((refwh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(whitem->type & DEV_CHAR)) > + continue; > + if (whitem->major != ~0 && whitem->major != refwh->major) > + continue; > + if (whitem->minor != ~0 && whitem->minor != refwh->minor) > + continue; > + if (refwh->access & (~(whitem->access | ACC_MASK))) > + continue; > + return 1; > + } > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * parent_has_perm: > + * when adding a new allow rule to a device whitelist, the rule > + * must be allowed in the parent device > + */ > +static int parent_has_perm(struct cgroup *childcg, > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) > +{ > + struct cgroup *pcg = childcg->parent; > + struct dev_cgroup *parent; > + int ret; > + > + if (!pcg) > + return 1; > + parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(pcg); > + spin_lock(&parent->lock); > + ret = may_access_whitelist(parent, wh); > + spin_unlock(&parent->lock); > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Modify the whitelist using allow/deny rules. > + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this. It's at least separate from > CAP_MKNOD > + * so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not > + * modify the whitelist. > + * It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow > + * us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the > + * device whitelist controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN > + * > + * Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Granting > + * new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your > + * parent cgroup has the access you're asking for. > + */ > +static ssize_t devcgroup_access_write(struct cgroup *cgroup, struct > cftype *cft, > + struct file *file, const char __user *userbuf, > + size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + struct cgroup *cur_cgroup; > + struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, *cur_devcgroup; > + int filetype = cft->private; > + char *buffer, *b; > + int retval = 0, count; > + struct dev_whitelist_item wh; > + > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); > + cur_cgroup = task_cgroup(current, devices_subsys.subsys_id); > + cur_devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cur_cgroup); > + > + buffer = kmalloc(nbytes+1, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buffer) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + if (copy_from_user(buffer, userbuf, nbytes)) { > + retval = -EFAULT; > + goto out1; > + } > + buffer[nbytes] = 0; /* nul-terminate */ > + > + cgroup_lock(); > + if (cgroup_is_removed(cgroup)) { > + retval = -ENODEV; > + goto out2; > + } > + > + memset(&wh, 0, sizeof(wh)); > + b = buffer; > + > + switch (*b) { > + case 'a': > + wh.type = DEV_ALL; > + wh.access = ACC_MASK; > + goto handle; > + case 'b': > + wh.type = DEV_BLOCK; > + break; > + case 'c': > + wh.type = DEV_CHAR; > + break; > + default: > + retval = -EINVAL; > + goto out2; > + } > + b += 2; What happens if you do echo -n b > /cgroups/1/devices.allow? > + if (*b == '*') { > + wh.major = ~0; > + b++; > + } else if (isdigit(*b)) { > + wh.major = 0; > + while (isdigit(*b)) { > + wh.major = wh.major*10+(*b-'0'); > + b++; > + } > + } else { > + retval = -EINVAL; > + goto out2; > + } > + if (*b != ':') { > + retval = -EINVAL; > + goto out2; > + } > + b++; > + > + /* read minor */ > + if (*b == '*') { > + wh.minor = ~0; > + b++; > + } else if (isdigit(*b)) { > + wh.minor = 0; > + while (isdigit(*b)) { > + wh.minor = wh.minor*10+(*b-'0'); > + b++; > + } > + } else { > + retval = -EINVAL; > + goto out2; > + } > + if (!isspace(*b)) { > + retval = -EINVAL; > + goto out2; > + } > + for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) { > + switch (*b) { > + case 'r': > + wh.access |= ACC_READ; > + break; > + case 'w': > + wh.access |= ACC_WRITE; > + break; > + case 'm': > + wh.access |= ACC_MKNOD; > + break; > + case '\n': > + case '\0': Shouldn't this set count to 3, causing the outer for loop to break as well? > + break; > + default: > + retval = -EINVAL; > + goto out2; > + } > + } > + > +handle: > + retval = 0; > + switch (filetype) { > + case DEVCG_ALLOW: > + if (!parent_has_perm(cgroup, &wh)) > + retval = -EPERM; > + else > + retval = dev_whitelist_add(devcgroup, &wh); > + break; > + case DEVCG_DENY: > + dev_whitelist_rm(devcgroup, &wh); > + break; > + default: > + retval = -EINVAL; > + goto out2; > + } > + > + if (retval == 0) > + retval = nbytes; > + > +out2: > + cgroup_unlock(); > +out1: > + kfree(buffer); > + return retval; > +} > + > +static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = { > + { > + .name = "allow", > + .read = devcgroup_access_read, > + .write = devcgroup_access_write, > + .private = DEVCG_ALLOW, > + }, > + { > + .name = "deny", > + .write = devcgroup_access_write, > + .private = DEVCG_DENY, > + }, > +}; > + > +static int devcgroup_populate(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, > + struct cgroup *cgroup) > +{ > + return cgroup_add_files(cgroup, ss, dev_cgroup_files, > + ARRAY_SIZE(dev_cgroup_files)); > +} > + > +struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = { > + .name = "devices", > + .can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach, > + .create = devcgroup_create, > + .destroy = devcgroup_destroy, > + .populate = devcgroup_populate, > + .subsys_id = devices_subsys_id, > +}; > + > +int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > +{ > + struct cgroup *cgroup; > + struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; > + > + dev_t device = inode->i_rdev; > + if (!device) > + return 0; > + if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) > + return 0; > + cgroup = task_cgroup(current, devices_subsys.subsys_id); > + dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); > + if (!dev_cgroup) > + return 0; > + > + spin_lock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + list_for_each_entry(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { > + if (wh->type & DEV_ALL) > + goto acc_check; > + if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) > + continue; > + if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) > + continue; > + if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != imajor(inode)) > + continue; > + if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != iminor(inode)) > + continue; > +acc_check: > + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && !(wh->access & ACC_WRITE)) > + continue; > + if ((mask & MAY_READ) && !(wh->access & ACC_READ)) > + continue; > + spin_unlock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + return 0; > + } > + spin_unlock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + > + return -EPERM; > +} > + > +int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) > +{ > + struct cgroup *cgroup; > + struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; > + struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; > + > + cgroup = task_cgroup(current, devices_subsys.subsys_id); > + dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); > + if (!dev_cgroup) > + return 0; > + > + spin_lock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + list_for_each_entry(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { > + if (wh->type & DEV_ALL) > + goto acc_check; > + if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode)) > + continue; > + if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(mode)) > + continue; > + if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != MAJOR(dev)) > + continue; > + if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != MINOR(dev)) > + continue; > +acc_check: > + if (!(wh->access & ACC_MKNOD)) > + continue; > + spin_unlock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + return 0; > + } > + spin_unlock(&dev_cgroup->lock); > + return -EPERM; > +} > -- > 1.5.1.1.GIT > -- Daniel Hokka Zakrisson -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/