To: viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk
CC: miklos@szeredi.hu, haveblue@us.ibm.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
       hch@infradead.org
In-reply-to: <20080321155451.GU10722@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (message from Al Viro
	on Fri, 21 Mar 2008 15:54:51 +0000)
Subject: Re: r-o bind in nfsd
References: <E1Jciie-0001E6-Dx@pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu> <20080321155451.GU10722@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Message-Id: <E1Jck2N-0001Q3-7W@pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu>
From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2008 17:24:11 +0100
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Content-Length: 1147
Lines: 29

> > I know there are a few cases, where filesystems call vfs_foo()
> > internally, where the vfsmount isn't available, but I think the proper
> > solution is just to fix those places, and not recurse back into the
> > VFS (which is AFAICS in all those cases totally unnecessary anyway).
> > This would make everybody happy, no?
> 
> Apparmor can go play with itself.  The proper fix is to lift the LSM nonsense
> into callers and leave vfs_...() alone;

Maybe.  I know precious little about this security thing, so I won't
argue about it's merits or faults.  But:

 a) I have a hunch that the security guys wouldn't like to see the
 order between permission() and security_foo() changed.

 b) I fail to see how moving functionality to callers would improve
 things

> vfsmounts should *not* be passed there at all, with the exception of
> vfs_follow_link() which gets the full nameidata.

Why?

Miklos
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