Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1762025AbYHERcd (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 13:32:33 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1759447AbYHERcY (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 13:32:24 -0400 Received: from gprs189-60.eurotel.cz ([160.218.189.60]:4318 "EHLO spitz.ucw.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1760121AbYHERcX (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 13:32:23 -0400 Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2008 19:32:09 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: david safford Cc: Andrew Morton , Mimi Zohar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, serue@linux.vnet.ibm.com, sailer@watson.ibm.com, zohar@us.ibm.com, Stephen Smalley , CaseySchaufler Subject: Re: [RFC][Patch 5/5]integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider Message-ID: <20080805173208.GA8380@ucw.cz> References: <1211555145.16195.18.camel@new-host> <20080528012242.a0e98d87.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <1214324930.3262.94.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1214324930.3262.94.camel@localhost.localdomain> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1543 Lines: 34 On Tue 2008-06-24 12:28:50, david safford wrote: > On Wed, 2008-05-28 at 01:22 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > > > - I see lots of user file I/O being done from within the kernel. > > This makes eyebrows raise. Also some other eyebrow-raising > > file-related things in there. > > > > Generally: the code is all moderately intrusive into the VFS and this > > sort of thing does need careful explanation and justification, please. > > Once we have some understanding of what you're trying to achieve here > > we will inevitably ask "can't that be done in userspace". So it would > > be best if your description were to preemptively answer all that. > > > > > Sorry about this delayed response - we are about to repost for RFC, and > noticed we missed responding to this. > > The Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires that all files be measured, > (hashed) and the measurement committed to the hardware TPM before any > data of the file is accessed in any way. In addition, if the measurement > is incorrect, all access to the file must be denied. TPM model may require this, but what is the benefit to the user/owner of the machine? Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/