Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1763090AbYHERjc (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 13:39:32 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1762645AbYHERi6 (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 13:38:58 -0400 Received: from casper.infradead.org ([85.118.1.10]:45853 "EHLO casper.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1762564AbYHERi4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 13:38:56 -0400 Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2008 10:38:40 -0700 From: Arjan van de Ven To: Eric Paris Cc: "Press, Jonathan" , Greg KH , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, malware-list@lists.printk.net, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interfaceforon access scanning Message-ID: <20080805103840.1aaa64a5@infradead.org> In-Reply-To: <1217956796.11547.12.camel@paris.rdu.redhat.com> References: <1217883616.27684.19.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20080804223249.GA10517@kroah.com> <1217896374.27684.53.camel@localhost.localdomain> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530304807431@USILMS12.ca.com> <1217948212.27684.120.camel@localhost.localdomain> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530304807436@USILMS12.ca.com> <1217956796.11547.12.camel@paris.rdu.redhat.com> Organization: Intel X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.5.0 (GTK+ 2.12.11; i386-redhat-linux-gnu) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SRS-Rewrite: SMTP reverse-path rewritten from by casper.infradead.org See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1368 Lines: 34 On Tue, 05 Aug 2008 13:19:56 -0400 Eric Paris wrote: > If you can outline the design of a better method that meets your needs > I'd be glad to try to code it. In your mind how do you see programs > being able to exclude others while not being a security risk? ok so lets be specific. You are trying to prevent an application from opening a "damaged" file, or from someone starting a "damaged" file. You are not trying to prevent anything once you have executed a damaged file; once you execute one of these for this part it's game over (to limit the damage other tools like selinux exist, but are outside the scope of talpa). So... as long as /sbin/init isn't compromised... intercepting exec and open (in all variants) is all you need. And this can be done from userland with the preload: the "workaround" from the preload assumes you've already executed malicious code, which is outside of your protection scope. What am I missing? -- If you want to reach me at my work email, use arjan@linux.intel.com For development, discussion and tips for power savings, visit http://www.lesswatts.org -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/