Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1763167AbYHESCq (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 14:02:46 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1758704AbYHESCf (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 14:02:35 -0400 Received: from casper.infradead.org ([85.118.1.10]:54437 "EHLO casper.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757226AbYHESCe (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 14:02:34 -0400 Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2008 11:02:21 -0700 From: Arjan van de Ven To: Alan Cox Cc: Eric Paris , "Press, Jonathan" , Greg KH , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, malware-list@lists.printk.net, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interfaceforon access scanning Message-ID: <20080805110221.57e4b46c@infradead.org> In-Reply-To: <20080805182944.262f20d7@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> References: <1217883616.27684.19.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20080804223249.GA10517@kroah.com> <1217896374.27684.53.camel@localhost.localdomain> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530304807431@USILMS12.ca.com> <1217948212.27684.120.camel@localhost.localdomain> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530304807436@USILMS12.ca.com> <1217956796.11547.12.camel@paris.rdu.redhat.com> <20080805103840.1aaa64a5@infradead.org> <20080805182944.262f20d7@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Organization: Intel X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.5.0 (GTK+ 2.12.11; i386-redhat-linux-gnu) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SRS-Rewrite: SMTP reverse-path rewritten from by casper.infradead.org See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 852 Lines: 30 On Tue, 5 Aug 2008 18:29:44 +0100 Alan Cox wrote: > > And this can be done from userland with the preload: the > > "workaround" from the preload assumes you've already executed > > malicious code, which is outside of your protection scope. > > > > What am I missing? > > Scripts get either opened or exec'd... (ignoring stdin-fed scripts right now.. but that's a problem regardless) > Attempts to screen content can you explain? > Exec occuring after ld.so is compromised this is post-compromise scenario; if you have enough root rights to do that then it's game over. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/