Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757990AbYHFAqW (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 20:46:22 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754880AbYHFAqL (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 20:46:11 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([66.187.233.31]:46769 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752400AbYHFAqK (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Aug 2008 20:46:10 -0400 Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2008 20:46:00 -0400 From: Rik van Riel To: Eric Paris Cc: Greg KH , Al Viro , "Press, Jonathan" , Theodore Tso , Arjan van de Ven , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, malware-list@lists.printk.net, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro toalinuxinterfaceforonaccess scanning Message-ID: <20080805204600.03ceca31@bree.surriel.com> In-Reply-To: <1217982329.27684.214.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E85553030480743F@USILMS12.ca.com> <20080805185438.GA8453@mit.edu> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530304AE4ADB@USILMS12.ca.com> <20080805211445.GA28304@kroah.com> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530304AE4ADC@USILMS12.ca.com> <20080805214415.GA5830@kroah.com> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530303E21D47@USILMS12.ca.com> <20080805222638.GA6395@kroah.com> <20080805233743.GK28946@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <1217980132.27684.203.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20080806001124.GA9079@kroah.com> <1217982329.27684.214.camel@localhost.localdomain> Organization: Red Hat, Inc. X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.0.2 (GTK+ 2.10.4; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1545 Lines: 42 On Tue, 05 Aug 2008 20:25:29 -0400 Eric Paris wrote: > I don't think its hiding, I'm attempting to bring these companies who > just don't understand how to work in public That's not my worry. My real worry is that the anti-virus companies have been working with an enforcement policy that has been evolving slowly from the DOS days, while today's threat model has changed considerably. I do not see how the proposed hooks would close off a system sufficiently to claim anything approaching security. The way forward is to: 1) define a threat model 2) figure out what infrastructure is needed for protection 3) come up with interfaces that also help other software (eg. file range inotify to help disk indexing software) Trying to shoe-horn the DOS anti-virus security model into a multi-user operating system with networking may not be sufficient protection for today's world. Eg. it does not protect against script virusses fetched off web sites and executed directly in a browser, office suite or any gnome-vfs enabled program. This is a major vulnerability in modern systems. What problem are we really trying to solve? Which problems are out of scope? What infrastructure can solve the problem, while being useful for other things too? -- All rights reversed. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/