Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756008AbYHHKyS (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Aug 2008 06:54:18 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754082AbYHHKyF (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Aug 2008 06:54:05 -0400 Received: from smtp-relay.mail.avira.com ([80.190.154.36]:52786 "EHLO smtp-relay.mail.avira.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751019AbYHHKyD convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Aug 2008 06:54:03 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 302 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Fri, 08 Aug 2008 06:54:03 EDT From: =?iso-8859-1?q?J=F6rg_Ostertag?= Organization: Avira GmbH To: Theodore Tso , Rik van Riel , Eric Paris , Greg KH , Al Viro , "Press, Jonathan" , Arjan van de Ven , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, malware-list@lists.printk.net, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [malware-list] Threat model for Unix Computers Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2008 12:48:55 +0200 User-Agent: KMail/1.9.5 References: <20080805211445.GA28304@kroah.com> <20080805204600.03ceca31@bree.surriel.com> <20080806014435.GF8224@mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <20080806014435.GF8224@mit.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Content-Disposition: inline Message-Id: <200808081248.55590.Joerg.Ostertag@avira.com> X-Signature: Avira-GmbH X-AntiVirus: checked by Avira MailGate (version: 2.1.4-7; AVE: 7.8.1.19; VDF: 7.0.5.232; host: klemmer.intra.avira.com); id=16679-dEcJdW X-AntiVirus: checked by Avira MailGate (version: 2.1.4-7; AVE: 7.8.1.19; VDF: 7.0.5.232; host: smtp-relay.mail.avira.com); id=32183-MW1pC4 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4678 Lines: 127 Am Mittwoch, 6. August 2008 03:44 schrieb Theodore Tso: > On Tue, Aug 05, 2008 at 08:46:00PM -0400, Rik van Riel wrote: ... I'm trying to fill in some other thread models, not all directly related to virus-scanning, but if we want to get a complete anti-threat model for linux, we should take them into account too. In addition I'll add some usage scenarios for later extracting some threat scenarios ... Desktop-Users: ---------------------- > The Linux Desktop (where clueless users may be tricked into > running malware). I would add the chance of users exporting there locally stored Files via CIFS, SMB, http, ... for accessing them with there beloveled streaming clients. Speaking of exporting Files from a Desktop PC we should also take in account File-Sharing clients. Some more examples of a Desktop Users desire would be: - copying Files to/from there PDA (BT,USB,WLAN) - sharing internet connection with there PDA (BT,USB,WLAN) Another threads would be: - giving access to the Desktop-PC to guest-users for "just let me look up something in the internet" and the guest-user on the Desktop not informing about the (in his point of view) urgent installation of there beloved Browser-malware^H^H^H^H^H -adware ^H^H^H^H^H -extention For all the Files stored on the Desktop PC we should also take in account, that the paranoid Desktop user would store them inside a crypted device/container. Some examples would be: truecrypt-container/-partition, External crypted Harddrive, ... ... speaking of storing Files I would expect even Desktop Homeusers to store there Files on a local mini Fileserver (like a Fritz-Box, NSLU2, ...) to share them with other devices like Multimedia players, ... Notebook-Users: ------------------------ And then we have the Linux Notebook users. I separate these from the Desktop users, because they will have most of the Scenarios for Desktop users plus some additional treats. - Connecting to random accesspoints (Airports, Hotels, ...) - Exporting there Wireless (BT,WLAN,UMTS, ...) to random people. Sometimes willingly, sometimes unwillingly - leaving there Notebooks unattended - without Bios password - without HDD-encrytion - without Boot-Manager Password - without screenlock - ... Linux Desktops in public places: -------------------------------------------- I'm thinking of Linux Desktop PCs in places like Internet-Cafe, Public-Library, School, ... These would be similar to the Standard Linux Desktop but adding some additional threats. - willingly trying to attack the PC with physical access to - CD-Rom - USB-Devices USB-Stick Card Reader - Network cable - Floppy drive (if still existing) - Reset Button > The Linux File Server (where it is *highly* unlikely to have > active running malware, since there are no clueless > users running on said file server), but where malware > may be stored and read over CIFS, NFS, etc. Maybe it "was" unlikely, but you can see more and more (Now-)Unix-administrators originally used to other operating systems and with a different view to security. So it would be nice if we would be able to protect these users/admins/installations too. Mail-Proxy: -------------- > The Linux Mail server is really a restricted case of the Linux > Fileserver; where the only way in is SMTP, and the > only protocol out is IMAP/POP. I would add SMTP for the outgoing channel too. Web-Proxy: ---------------- Only to complete the list: The Linux Web Proxy is another example of a Linux Server. The way in would be http traffic (mostly over port 80 and 443) and the way out will be either over a shared proxy port or offered transparent if the Linux machine is used as router. In my opinion all good webproxies with scanner already provide a pretty good solution here. -- J?rg Ostertag - Manager UNIX SW Development - Avira GmbH Phone: +49 (0) 7542/500-500 Fax: +49 (0) 7542/500-576 Lindauer Str. 21, D-88069 Tettnang, Germany, http://www.avira.com PGP Key-ID: 0x46BDEF37 Gesch?ftsf?hrender Gesellschafter: Tjark Auerbach Sitz der Gesellschaft: Tettnang Handelsregister: Amtsgericht Ulm, HRB 630992 ALLGEMEINE GESCH?FTSBEDINGUNGEN Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Gesch?ftsbedingungen (AGB). Sie finden sie in der jeweils g?ltigen Fassung im Internet unter http://www.avira.de/agb *************************************************** -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/