Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2008 22:45:16 +0100
From: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: daw-news@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Cc: daw@cs.berkeley.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linuxinterfaceforon
 access scanning
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On Mon, 11 Aug 2008 21:53:23 +0000 (UTC)
daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) wrote:

> David Collier-Brown writes:
> >Arjan van de Ven wrote:
> >> we do still appreciate your description, since I don't think there's a
> >> clear "here's what we really try to protect against" statement yet.
> >
> >  Perhaps I could try: the AV folks are trying to prevent the
> >execution of either modified normal binaries/files or 
> >specifically exploit binaries/files, by machines for which the 
> >files are executable or interpretable.
> 
> 1. We already know how to prevent/detect modifications to
> normal binaries.  See Tripwire etc.  As far as I know, no new
> kernel technology is needed.

Tripwire is incredibly ineffecient and ineffectual because we don't have
a scalable 'file was modified' notifier

Alan
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