Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756289AbYHQWPG (ORCPT ); Sun, 17 Aug 2008 18:15:06 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751887AbYHQWOz (ORCPT ); Sun, 17 Aug 2008 18:14:55 -0400 Received: from atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz ([195.113.26.193]:56643 "EHLO atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751961AbYHQWOz (ORCPT ); Sun, 17 Aug 2008 18:14:55 -0400 Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 00:14:53 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: david@lang.hm Cc: Eric Paris , Theodore Tso , Rik van Riel , davecb@sun.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Adrian Bunk , Mihai Don??u , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, malware-list@lists.printk.net, Arjan van de Ven Subject: Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to alinuxinterfaceforon access scanning Message-ID: <20080817221453.GD21112@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> References: <20080813125638.GB6995@ucw.cz> <20080813135207.CC08C3765BC@pmx1.sophos.com> <20080814125410.GA2262@elf.ucw.cz> <2629CC4E1D22A64593B02C43E855530304AE4BE3@USILMS12.ca.com> <20080814223918.GC6370@elf.ucw.cz> <20080814200005.6b363716@bree.surriel.com> <20080815004335.GF13048@mit.edu> <1218769209.16613.31.camel@localhost.localdomain> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.13 (2006-08-11) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2015 Lines: 42 > On Thu, 14 Aug 2008, Eric Paris wrote: > > >>But Pavel is raising a good question. In Eric's proposed threat > >>model, he claimed the only thing that he was trying to solve was > >>"scanning". Just file scanning. That implies no root privileges, but > >>it also implied that he wasn't worried about malware running with user > >>privileges, either. Presumbly, that would be caught and stopped by > >>the file scanner before the malware had a chance to run; that is the > >>execve(2) system call would also be blocked until the executable was > >>scanned. > >> > >>So if that is the threat model, then the only thing libmalware.so > >>doesn't solve is knfsd access, and it should be evaluated on that > >>basis. If the threat model *does* include malware which is **not** > >>caught by the AV scanner, and is running with user privileges, then > >>there are a whole host of other attacks that we have to worry about. > >>So let's be real clear, up front, what the threat model is, and avoid > >>changing the model around to rule out solutions that don't fit the > >>initially preconceived one. That's how you get to the TSA > >>confiscating water bottles in airport security lines. > > > >No, I'm not claiming to protect against running processes. I'll leave > >that for SELinux. > > > >I haven't seen this supposed libmalware.so so take anything I say with a > >grain of sand. But I take it that the solutions to the problems are > >'don't do that.' > > libmalware.so is shorthand for 'have a userspace library do the scanning > and handle the open' (snip). Agreed, you explained it better than I would. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/