Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755811AbYHVTec (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Aug 2008 15:34:32 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752793AbYHVTeX (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Aug 2008 15:34:23 -0400 Received: from e31.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.149]:56844 "EHLO e31.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753444AbYHVTeW (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Aug 2008 15:34:22 -0400 Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2008 14:34:13 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: lkml , SELinux , "David P. Quigley" Subject: [PATCH 1/1] selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy Message-ID: <20080822193413.GA8401@us.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.17+20080114 (2008-01-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 12928 Lines: 427 In August 2006 I posted a patch to the selinux list generating a minimal SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against the kernel. In addition to some fixes, also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. I've gone ahead and hooked it into the kernel Makefile logic. The way I have it here, doing 'make scripts' ends up compiling 'mdp', after which you must cd scripts/selinux sh install_policy.sh That isn't as nice as being able to do make selinux_install the way David had it, but it avoids mucking with the top-level Makefile. Which is preferred? In any case, this seems like a good thing to have in the kernel tree, to facilitate simple selinux boot tests. Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially bc it has stats on the generated policies): ====================================================================== For those interested in the changes there were only two significant changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place holders for the user space object classes. The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. Some statistics on the policy that it generates: The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. ====================================================================== (then a few versions later...): ====================================================================== The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the allow rules (one for each object class including user space object classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. ====================================================================== Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn --- scripts/Makefile | 1 + scripts/selinux/Makefile | 1 + scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh | 49 ++++++++ scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile | 4 + scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts | 6 + scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c | 242 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/Makefile create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile index 1c73c5a..0741e9e 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile +++ b/scripts/Makefile @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ hostprogs-y += unifdef subdir-$(CONFIG_MODVERSIONS) += genksyms subdir-y += mod +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux # Let clean descend into subdirs subdir- += basic kconfig package diff --git a/scripts/selinux/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5660bb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +subdir-y := mdp diff --git a/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b64642 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +#!/bin/sh +if [ `id -u` -ne 0 ]; then + echo "$0: must be root to install the selinux policy" + exit 1 +fi +SF=`which setfiles` +if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then + if [ -f /usr/sbin/setfiles ]; then + SF="/usr/sbin/setfiles" + else + echo "no selinux tools installed: setfiles" + exit 1 + fi +fi + +cd mdp + +CP=`which checkpolicy` +./mdp policy.conf file_contexts +$CP -o policy.`checkpolicy -V | awk '{print $1}'` policy.conf + +mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/policy +mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files + +cp file_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files +cp dbus_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts +cp policy.`checkpolicy -V | awk '{print $1}'` /etc/selinux/dummy/policy +FC_FILE=/etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files/file_contexts +if [ ! -f $FC_FILE ]; then + echo "no file contests file. Please run" + echo "make selinux_policy_install" + exit 1 +fi + +cd /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files +$SF file_contexts / + +mounts=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | egrep "ext2|ext3|xfs|jfs" | awk '{ print $2 '}` +for line in $mounts; do + $SF file_contexts $line +done + +dodev=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | grep "/dev "` +if [ "eq$dodev" != "eq" ]; then + mount --move /dev /mnt + $SF file_contexts /dev + mount --move /mnt /dev +fi + diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b55b2fe --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +hostprogs-y := mdp +HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include + +always := $(hostprogs-y) diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts b/scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..116e684 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + + + + + diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2a73c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +/* + * + * mdp - make dummy policy + * + * When pointed at a kernel tree, builds a dummy policy for that kernel + * with exactly one type with full rights to itself. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + * + * Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2006 + * + * Authors: Serge E. Hallyn + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "flask.h" + +void usage(char *name) +{ + printf("usage: %s [-m] policy_file context_file\n", name); + exit(1); +} + +void find_common_name(char *cname, char *dest, int len) +{ + char *start, *end; + + start = strchr(cname, '_')+1; + end = strchr(start, '_'); + if (!start || !end || start-cname > len || end-start > len) { + printf("Error with commons defines\n"); + exit(1); + } + strncpy(dest, start, end-start); + dest[end-start] = '\0'; +} + +#define S_(x) x, +static char *classlist[] = { +#include "class_to_string.h" + NULL +}; +#undef S_ + +#include "initial_sid_to_string.h" + +#define TB_(x) char *x[] = { +#define TE_(x) NULL }; +#define S_(x) x, +#include "common_perm_to_string.h" +#undef TB_ +#undef TE_ +#undef S_ + +struct common { + char *cname; + char **perms; +}; +struct common common[] = { +#define TB_(x) { #x, x }, +#define S_(x) +#define TE_(x) +#include "common_perm_to_string.h" +#undef TB_ +#undef TE_ +#undef S_ +}; + +#define S_(x, y, z) {x, #y}, +struct av_inherit { + int class; + char *common; +}; +struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = { +#include "av_inherit.h" +}; +#undef S_ + +#include "av_permissions.h" +#define S_(x, y, z) {x, y, z}, +struct av_perms { + int class; + int perm_i; + char *perm_s; +}; +struct av_perms av_perms[] = { +#include "av_perm_to_string.h" +}; +#undef S_ + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int i, j, mls = 0; + char **arg, *polout, *ctxout; + int classlist_len, initial_sid_to_string_len; + FILE *fout; + + if (argc < 3) + usage(argv[0]); + arg = argv+1; + if (argc==4 && strcmp(argv[1], "-m") == 0) { + mls = 1; + arg++; + } + polout = *arg++; + ctxout = *arg; + + fout = fopen(polout, "w"); + if (!fout) { + printf("Could not open %s for writing\n", polout); + usage(argv[0]); + } + + classlist_len = sizeof(classlist) / sizeof(char *); + /* print out the classes */ + for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) { + if(classlist[i]) + fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]); + else + fprintf(fout, "class user%d\n", i); + } + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + + initial_sid_to_string_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *); + /* print out the sids */ + for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++) + fprintf(fout, "sid %s\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]); + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + + /* print out the commons */ + for (i=0; i< sizeof(common)/sizeof(struct common); i++) { + char cname[101]; + find_common_name(common[i].cname, cname, 100); + cname[100] = '\0'; + fprintf(fout, "common %s\n{\n", cname); + for (j=0; common[i].perms[j]; j++) + fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", common[i].perms[j]); + fprintf(fout, "}\n\n"); + } + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + + /* print out the class permissions */ + for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) { + if (classlist[i]) { + int firstperm = -1, numperms = 0; + + fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]); + /* does it inherit from a common? */ + for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_inherit)/sizeof(struct av_inherit); j++) + if (av_inherit[j].class == i) + fprintf(fout, "inherits %s\n", av_inherit[j].common); + + for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_perms)/sizeof(struct av_perms); j++) { + if (av_perms[j].class == i) { + if (firstperm == -1) + firstperm = j; + numperms++; + } + } + if (!numperms) { + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + continue; + } + + fprintf(fout, "{\n"); + /* print out the av_perms */ + for (j=0; j < numperms; j++) { + fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", av_perms[firstperm+j].perm_s); + } + fprintf(fout, "}\n\n"); + } + } + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + + /* NOW PRINT OUT MLS STUFF */ + if (mls) { + printf("MLS not yet implemented\n"); + exit(1); + } + + /* types, roles, and allows */ + fprintf(fout, "type base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "role base_r types { base_t };\n"); + for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) { + if (classlist[i]) + fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n", classlist[i]); + else + fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:user%d *;\n", i); + } + fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r };\n"); + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + + /* default sids */ + for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++) + fprintf(fout, "sid %s user_u:base_r:base_t\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]); + fprintf(fout, "\n"); + + + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext3 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr xfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr reiserfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task pipefs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task sockfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans devpts user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans tmpfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans shm user_u:base_r:base_t;\n"); + + fprintf(fout, "genfscon proc / user_u:base_r:base_t\n"); + + fclose(fout); + + fout = fopen(ctxout, "w"); + if (!fout) { + printf("Wrote policy, but cannot open %s for writing\n", ctxout); + usage(argv[0]); + } + fprintf(fout, "/ user_u:base_r:base_t\n"); + fprintf(fout, "/.* user_u:base_r:base_t\n"); + fclose(fout); + + return 0; +} -- 1.5.4.3 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/