Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756101AbYJTW20 (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:28:26 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1755743AbYJTW1G (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:27:06 -0400 Received: from mx2.redhat.com ([66.187.237.31]:55651 "EHLO mx2.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755717AbYJTW1F (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:27:05 -0400 From: Eric Paris Subject: [PATCH 0/4] Audit support for file capabilities To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.ok, sgrubb@redhat.com, serue@us.ibm.com, morgan@kernel.org Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2008 18:25:57 -0400 Message-ID: <20081020222538.3895.50175.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> User-Agent: StGIT/0.14.3 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1113 Lines: 25 The following series implements audit support for file capabilities. Audit emits relevant fcaps infor for all path records, any time fcaps actually escalate permissions, and we now print the arguments to sys_capset for when a process tries to modify cap info. --- Eric Paris (4): AUDIT: emit new record type showing all capset information AUDIT: audit when fcaps increase the permitted or inheritable capabilities AUDIT: output permitted and inheritable fcaps in PATH records CAPABILITIES: add cpu endian vfs caps structure include/linux/audit.h | 22 +++++ include/linux/capability.h | 12 +++ kernel/auditsc.c | 201 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/capability.c | 3 + security/commoncap.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++------------- 5 files changed, 308 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/