From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Organization: Hewlett-Packard
To: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v1 1/3] SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2008 12:46:20 -0400
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Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
       selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
       sds@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@nameil.org, morgan@kernel.org,
       casey@schaufler-ca.com, esandeen@redhat.com
References: <20081029190652.31292.5901.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> <20081030152940.GA24853@us.ibm.com>
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On Thursday 30 October 2008 11:29:40 am Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com):
> > Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use
> > audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security
> > decision.  Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when
> > deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for
> > the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes
> > are root processes and should be less likely to be killed.  These
> > types of security system requests should not be audited or logged
> > since they are not really security decisions.  It would be possible
> > to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
> > by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into
> > that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide
> > complex indirection.
> >
> > This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and
> > to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not
> > security decisions.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
>
> Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1.
> I.e.
>
> #define CAP_NOAUDIT 0
> #define CAP_AUDIT 1
>
> Otherwise, looks fine.

As a general rule aren't boolean arguments like this frowned upon, with 
variations on the function preferred, i.e. something like below?

 int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
 int cap_capable_audit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);

-- 
paul moore
linux @ hp
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