Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756783AbYKDTHx (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Nov 2008 14:07:53 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756606AbYKDTHj (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Nov 2008 14:07:39 -0500 Received: from mx2.redhat.com ([66.187.237.31]:38287 "EHLO mx2.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753981AbYKDTHg (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Nov 2008 14:07:36 -0500 Subject: Re: [PATCH -v2 3/4] AUDIT: collect info when execve results in caps in pE From: Eric Paris To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, sgrubb@redhat.com, morgan@kernel.org, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk In-Reply-To: <20081104163540.GA24318@us.ibm.com> References: <20081103201742.12059.36030.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> <20081103201753.12059.67262.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> <20081104163540.GA24318@us.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2008 14:07:26 -0500 Message-Id: <1225825646.4662.22.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1913 Lines: 58 On Tue, 2008-11-04 at 10:35 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com): > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > index 8bb95ed..534abb5 100644 > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > > */ > > > > #include > > +#include > > #include > > #include > > #include > > @@ -373,6 +374,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) > > > > void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) > > { > > + kernel_cap_t pP = current->cap_permitted; > > + kernel_cap_t pE = current->cap_effective; > > + > > if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || > > !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted, > > current->cap_permitted)) { > > @@ -407,6 +411,12 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) > > } > > > > /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ > > + if (!cap_isclear(current->cap_effective)) { > > + if (!cap_issubset(current->cap_effective, CAP_FULL_SET) || > > Hi Eric, > > can you explain what the cap_issubset() check is for here? I'm glad you noticed it, because it is backwards! should be if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, current->cap_effective) || The idea is that I don't care to audit 1) full set && 2) this is root && 3) root should have a full set This would still consider a root without a full set because the bset had been changed to be an interesting event. I'm fine with that. I'll send -v3 once I hear comments on everything else.... -Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/