Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Tue, 5 Feb 2002 18:04:13 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Tue, 5 Feb 2002 18:04:03 -0500 Received: from tmr-02.dsl.thebiz.net ([216.238.38.204]:40708 "EHLO gatekeeper.tmr.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Tue, 5 Feb 2002 18:03:42 -0500 Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 18:02:48 -0500 (EST) From: Bill Davidsen To: Robert Love cc: Roland Dreier , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: Continuing /dev/random problems with 2.4 In-Reply-To: <1012862738.848.95.camel@phantasy> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 4 Feb 2002, Robert Love wrote: > The i8xx and other RNGs are different. They actually _give_ us the > random data. In other words, they generate entropy to just push > directly into the pool. The concern is that this data may not be safe, > and thus we need to run a fitness test on it (i.e. FIPS 190, I > believe). All this muck is new code and can exist in userspace -- > therefore it will. You seem to equate root space with user space, which is a kernel way of looking at things, particularly if you haven't been noting all the various hacker attacks lately. Just because it is possible to run in user space doesn't mean it's desirable to do so, and many sites don't really want things running as root so they can feed other things to the kernel. The assumption that power users will know how to fix it and other users won't notice they have no entropy isn't all that appealing to me, I want Linux to be as easy to do right as the competition. Just my read on it. -- bill davidsen CTO, TMR Associates, Inc Doing interesting things with little computers since 1979. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/