Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2008 10:29:25 +0000
From: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Geoffrey McRae <geoff@rabidhost.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: New Security Features, Please Comment
Message-ID: <20081203102925.1aa97d14@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
In-Reply-To: <1228268657.6679.4.camel@lappy.spacevs.com>
References: <1228260494.24232.21.camel@compy.ivent.com.au>
	<20081203005338.6472db7a@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
	<1228268657.6679.4.camel@lappy.spacevs.com>
Organization: Red Hat UK Cyf., Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street,
 Windsor, Berkshire, SL4 1TE, Y Deyrnas Gyfunol. Cofrestrwyd yng Nghymru a
 Lloegr o'r rhif cofrestru 3798903
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Content-Length: 748
Lines: 16

> The idea is to not allow the child to change its own uid, or give the
> child any elevated privlages so that should the child be compromised via
> buffer overflow or some other bug, it cant be abused.

But the child process can modify itself, it can open files etc.

So as uid 1 I patch my own code to add a function call to a private
function that will be called regularly. Now as the other uids are
selected I am able to attack all those users file stores.

I don't think your model actually works.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/