Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756757AbYLERQm (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Dec 2008 12:16:42 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756301AbYLERQa (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Dec 2008 12:16:30 -0500 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:46120 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753396AbYLERQ3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Dec 2008 12:16:29 -0500 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: lkml , David Howells , Michael Kerrisk , Dhaval Giani , James Morris References: <20081203191706.GA16433@us.ibm.com> <20081203191733.GA16652@us.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2008 09:14:05 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20081203191733.GA16652@us.ibm.com> (Serge E. Hallyn's message of "Wed, 3 Dec 2008 13:17:33 -0600") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.110006 (No Gnus v0.6) Emacs/21.4 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-XM-SPF: eid=;;;mid=;;;hst=mx04.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=24.130.11.59;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 24.130.11.59 X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: too long (recipient list exceeded maximum allowed size of 128 bytes) X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;"Serge E. Hallyn" X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Report: * -1.8 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -2.6 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 XM_SPF_Neutral SPF-Neutral Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 07 Dec 2006 04:40:56 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on mx04.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1326 Lines: 41 "Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > While ideally CLONE_NEWUSER will eventually require no > privilege, the required permission checks are currently > not there. As a result, CLONE_NEWUSER has the same effect > as a setuid(0)+setgroups(1,"0"). While we already require > CAP_SYS_ADMIN, requiring CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID seems > appropriate. Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" The patch looks good, and we are likely to need more caps to actually use it. > > Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn > --- > kernel/fork.c | 3 ++- > 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c > index 1dd8945..e3a85b3 100644 > --- a/kernel/fork.c > +++ b/kernel/fork.c > @@ -1344,7 +1344,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, > /* hopefully this check will go away when userns support is > * complete > */ > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SETUID) || > + !capable(CAP_SETGID)) > return -EPERM; > } > > -- > 1.5.4.3 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/