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Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 11:07:03 +1100 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
       Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
       Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
       "<David Safford" <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
       Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider
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References: <cover.1233262162.git.zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <eae67eb66b76df32f0e95c4cda33fd6271567c94.1233262163.git.zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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On Thu, 29 Jan 2009, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
> +# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
> +#
> +config IMA
> +	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
> +	depends on ACPI
> +	select SECURITYFS
> +	select CRYPTO
> +	select CRYPTO_HMAC
> +	select CRYPTO_MD5
> +	select CRYPTO_SHA1
> +	select TCG_TPM
> +	select TCG_TIS
> +	help
> +	  The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
> +	  Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
> +	  values of executables and other sensitive system files,
> +	  as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
> +	  to change the contents of an important system file
> +	  being measured, we can tell.

Out of interest, do you know if the TCG has analyzed their use of SHA-1 
in light of various attacks on the algorithm over the last few years?

The IETF has published analysis and recommendations relating to the use of 
SHA-1 (and other cryptographic hashes) with IP protocols:

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4894.txt
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4270.txt

It would be useful to know if similar analysis has been performed for TPM.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
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