Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751972AbZDERtX (ORCPT ); Sun, 5 Apr 2009 13:49:23 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751616AbZDERtI (ORCPT ); Sun, 5 Apr 2009 13:49:08 -0400 Received: from smtp106.prem.mail.sp1.yahoo.com ([98.136.44.61]:37546 "HELO smtp106.prem.mail.sp1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with SMTP id S1750975AbZDERtF (ORCPT ); Sun, 5 Apr 2009 13:49:05 -0400 X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 Message-ID: <49D8EF0C.3020503@schaufler-ca.com> Date: Sun, 05 Apr 2009 10:49:00 -0700 From: Casey Schaufler User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (Windows/20090302) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Etienne Basset CC: LSM , Eric Paris , Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-audit@redhat.com, Casey Schaufler Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security/smack implement logging V2 References: <49D8700A.8030605@numericable.fr> In-Reply-To: <49D8700A.8030605@numericable.fr> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 39407 Lines: 1346 Etienne Basset wrote: > the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions. > This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. > As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ' or " > It occurred to me later that \ should be disallowed as well. > It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch : > 0: no logging > 1: log denied (default) > 2: log accepted > 3: log denied&accepted > > > > Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset > --- > diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig > index 603b087..d83e708 100644 > --- a/security/smack/Kconfig > +++ b/security/smack/Kconfig > @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ > config SECURITY_SMACK > bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support" > - depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK > + depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT > AUDIT can't be required. While MAC does make sense in certain embedded environments, audit does not. > default n > help > This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. > diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h > index 42ef313..4639d56 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack.h > +++ b/security/smack/smack.h > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > /* > * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is > @@ -179,6 +180,11 @@ struct smack_known { > #define MAY_NOT 0 > > /* > + * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxa) > + */ > +#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 4 > + > +/* > * These functions are in smack_lsm.c > */ > struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *); > @@ -237,4 +243,22 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp) > return sip->smk_inode; > } > > +/* > + * logging functions > + */ > +struct smack_log_policy { > + int log_accepted; > + int log_denied; > +}; > Use bits in a integer rather than a pair of integers unless you are anticipating using multiple values for them. > + > +extern struct smack_log_policy log_policy; > + > +void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, > + int request, > + int result, struct common_audit_data *auditdata); > + > +int smk_access_log(char *subjectlabel, char *olabel, int access, > + struct common_audit_data *a); > +int smk_curacc_log(char *olabel, int access, struct common_audit_data *a); > It looks like the only difference between these are their non-logging versions is the logging. I say go ahead and add the auditdata parameter to smk_access and smk_curacc and allow for the case where it is NULL. > + > #endif /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */ > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c > index ac0a270..2da8a40 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c > @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > + > Remove the empty line. > #include "smack.h" > > struct smack_known smack_known_huh = { > @@ -59,6 +60,14 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list); > */ > static u32 smack_next_secid = 10; > > +/* what events do we log > + * can be overwriten at run-time by /smack/logging > + */ > +struct smack_log_policy log_policy = { > + .log_accepted = 0, > + .log_denied = 1 > +}; > + > As I mentioned before, log_policy should be an integer with bits defined for accepted and denied logging. > /** > * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object > * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label > @@ -185,6 +194,129 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode) > return rc; > } > > +/** > + * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a > + * readable string > + * @string : the string to fill > + * @access : the int > + * > + **/ > +static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access) > +{ > + int i = 0; > + if (access & MAY_READ) > + string[i++] = 'r'; > + if (access & MAY_WRITE) > + string[i++] = 'w'; > + if (access & MAY_EXEC) > + string[i++] = 'x'; > + if (access & MAY_APPEND) > + string[i++] = 'a'; > + string[i] = '\0'; > +} > + > +/** > + * smack_log_callback - SMACK specific information > + * will be called by generic audit code > + * @ab : the audit_buffer > + * @a : audit_data > + * > + */ > +static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) > +{ > + struct common_audit_data *ad = a; > +#define smack_info lsm_priv.smack_audit_data > Create a variable of the right type and assign it rather than this define. > + audit_log_format(ab, "SMACK[%s]: action=%s", ad->function, > + ad->smack_info.result ? "denied" : "granted"); > + audit_log_format(ab, " subject="); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->smack_info.subject); > I'm not 100% sure, but I think that untrustedstring is unnecessary with {'"\} disallowed and Smack labels always known to be NULL terminated strings. > + audit_log_format(ab, " object="); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->smack_info.object); > + audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", ad->smack_info.request); > +#undef smack_info > +} > + > +/** > + * smack_log - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. > + * @subject_label : smack label of the requester > + * @object_label : smack label of the object being accessed > + * @request: requested permissions > + * @result: result from smk_access > + * @a: auxiliary audit data > + * > + * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance > + * with the policy. > + **/ > +void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, > + int result, struct common_audit_data *a) > +{ > + char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; > + u32 denied; > + u32 audited = 0; > + > + /* check if we have to log the current event */ > + if (result != 0) { > + denied = 1; > + if (log_policy.log_denied) > + audited = 1; > + } else { > + denied = 0; > + if (log_policy.log_accepted) > + audited = 1; > + } > + if (audited == 0) > + return; > if (result == 0 && (log_policy & LOG_ACCEPTED) == 0) return; if (result == 1 && (log_policy & LOG_DENIED) == 0) return; Cleaner, no? > + > + if (a->function == NULL) > + a->function = "unknown"; > + > +#define smack_info lsm_priv.smack_audit_data > Use a variable instead of the define. > + /* end preparing the audit data */ > + smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request); > + a->smack_info.subject = subject_label; > + a->smack_info.object = object_label; > + a->smack_info.request = request_buffer; > + a->smack_info.result = result; > + a->lsm_pre_audit = smack_log_callback; > + > + common_lsm_audit(a); > +#undef smack_info > +} > + > +/** > + * smk_curracc_log : check access of current on olabel > + * @olabel : label being accessed > + * @access : access requested > + * @a : pointer to data > + * > + * return the same perm return by smk_curacc > + */ > +int smk_curacc_log(char *olabel, int access, struct common_audit_data *a) > +{ > + int rc; > + rc = smk_curacc(olabel, access); > + smack_log(current_security(), olabel, access, rc, a); > + return rc; > +} > I definitely think that adding the audit data to smk_curacc would work. > + > +/** > + * smk_access_log : check access of slabel on olabel > + * @slabel : subjet label > + * @olabel : label being accessed > + * @access : access requested > + * @a : pointer to data > + * > + * return the same perm return by smk_access > + */ > +int smk_access_log(char *slabel, char *olabel, int access, > + struct common_audit_data *a) > +{ > + int rc; > + rc = smk_access(slabel, olabel, access); > + smack_log(slabel, olabel, access, rc, a); > + return rc; > +} > + > As above. > static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock); > > /** > @@ -209,7 +341,8 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len) > if (found) > smack[i] = '\0'; > else if (i >= len || string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' || > - string[i] == '/') { > + string[i] == '/' || string[i] == '"' || > + string[i] == 0x27) { > I would prefer '\'' to 0x27, and add a check for '\\' please. > smack[i] = '\0'; > found = 1; > } else > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 9215149..c1844ed 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -103,14 +103,21 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack) > static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) > { > int rc; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode); > if (rc != 0) > return rc; > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = ctp; > It would be nice if audit data was only manipulated if audit is installed, but I don't like the idea of ifdeffing everything very much either. How about a static inline in smack.h that is ifdeffed for audit? smack_audit_init? There would need to be one for each field, too. Assign the result of current_security() to a variable so you don't have to call it multiple times. This comment applies in all instances below. > + /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(ctp), MAY_READWRITE); > if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > - return 0; > + rc = 0; > + > + smack_log(current_security(), task_security(ctp), > + MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -125,14 +132,21 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) > static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) > { > int rc; > - > + struct common_audit_data ad; > rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp); > if (rc != 0) > return rc; > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = ptp; > + > + /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(task_security(ptp), current_security(), MAY_READWRITE); > if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > - return 0; > + rc = 0; > + > + smack_log(task_security(ptp), current_security(), > + MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -327,8 +341,14 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) > static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) > { > struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + int rc; > > - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ); > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + > + rc = smk_curacc_log(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad); > + return rc; > } > > /** > @@ -346,8 +366,12 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, > char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) > { > struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE); > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = path->dentry; > + ad.u.fs.path.mnt = path->mnt; > + return smk_curacc_log(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -361,10 +385,14 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, > static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) > { > struct superblock_smack *sbp; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security; > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; > + ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt; > > - return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_log(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /* > @@ -441,15 +469,20 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, > static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, > struct dentry *new_dentry) > { > - int rc; > char *isp; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + int rc; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry; > > isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) { > isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > return rc; > @@ -466,18 +499,24 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, > static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) > { > struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + > /* > * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE); > - if (rc == 0) > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + if (rc == 0) { > /* > * You also need write access to the containing directory > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE); > - > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = NULL; > + ad.u.fs.inode = dir; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + } > return rc; > } > > @@ -491,17 +530,24 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) > */ > static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + > /* > * You need write access to the thing you're removing > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > - if (rc == 0) > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + if (rc == 0) { > /* > * You also need write access to the containing directory > */ > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = NULL; > + ad.u.fs.inode = dir; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > + } > > return rc; > } > @@ -525,15 +571,19 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, > { > int rc; > char *isp; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry; > > isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > > if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) { > isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode); > - rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry; > + rc = smk_curacc_log(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > - > return rc; > } > > @@ -548,14 +598,16 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, > */ > static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > /* > * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there. > */ > if (mask == 0) > return 0; > - > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask); > -} > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.inode = inode; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad); > + } > > /** > * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes > @@ -566,13 +618,15 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > */ > static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > /* > * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit. > */ > if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) > return 0; > - > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -584,7 +638,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) > */ > static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) > { > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -602,6 +661,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) > static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > int rc = 0; > > if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || > @@ -615,8 +675,11 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > } else > rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), > + MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > return rc; > } > @@ -671,7 +734,11 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > */ > static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > { > - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > + return smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad); > } > > /* > @@ -685,6 +752,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > */ > static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > int rc = 0; > > if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || > @@ -695,8 +763,11 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) > } else > rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), > + MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > return rc; > } > @@ -855,12 +926,16 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > unsigned long arg) > { > int rc = 0; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; > > if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > > if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad); > > return rc; > } > @@ -874,7 +949,11 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > */ > static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) > { > - return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path.dentry = file->f_path.dentry; > + return smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -888,8 +967,12 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) > static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > unsigned long arg) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); > + ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; > + > switch (cmd) { > case F_DUPFD: > case F_GETFD: > @@ -897,7 +980,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > case F_GETLK: > case F_GETOWN: > case F_GETSIG: > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad); > break; > case F_SETFD: > case F_SETFL: > @@ -905,10 +988,10 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > case F_SETLKW: > case F_SETOWN: > case F_SETSIG: > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > break; > default: > - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > > return rc; > @@ -943,14 +1026,20 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, > { > struct file *file; > int rc; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > /* > * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file > */ > file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); > + /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE); > if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > return 0; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = tsk; > + smack_log(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -963,7 +1052,10 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, > static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) > { > int may = 0; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path; > /* > * This code relies on bitmasks. > */ > @@ -972,7 +1064,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) > if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) > may |= MAY_WRITE; > > - return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may); > + return smk_curacc_log(file->f_security, may, &ad); > } > > /* > @@ -1052,6 +1144,22 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, > } > > /** > + * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access > + * @p: the task object > + * @access : the access requested > + * > + * Return 0 if access is permitted > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access) > +{ > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = p; > + return smk_curacc_log(task_security(p), access, &ad); > +} > I don't think that this is all that much help, and it adds a level indirection. Better to do the audit initialization in a consistent way, even if it is clumsy. Hum. It does happen a lot. I suppose it's OK. > + > +/** > * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid > * @p: the task object > * @pgid: unused > @@ -1060,7 +1168,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, > */ > static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1071,7 +1179,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > */ > static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1082,7 +1190,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) > */ > static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1110,7 +1218,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) > > rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1127,7 +1235,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) > > rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1139,7 +1247,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) > */ > static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1157,7 +1265,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, > > rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); > if (rc == 0) > - rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1169,7 +1277,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, > */ > static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1180,7 +1288,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) > */ > static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1198,18 +1306,23 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) > static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > int sig, u32 secid) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = p; > /* > * Sending a signal requires that the sender > * can write the receiver. > */ > if (secid == 0) > - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc_log(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad); > /* > * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO > * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing > * we can't take privilege into account. > */ > - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_access_log(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), > + MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -1220,12 +1333,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > */ > static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > { > + struct common_audit_data ad; > int rc; > > + /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */ > rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE); > if (rc == 0) > - return 0; > - > + goto out_log; > /* > * Allow the operation to succeed if either task > * has privilege to perform operations that might > @@ -1239,7 +1353,11 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > */ > if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > return 0; > Did you miss this return, or is this check special? > - > + /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */ > + out_log: > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, TASK); > + ad.u.tsk = p; > + smack_log(current_security(), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1455,12 +1573,18 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) > int sk_lbl; > char *hostsp; > struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > rcu_read_lock(); > hostsp = smack_host_label(sap); > if (hostsp != NULL) { > sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET; > - rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE); > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.family = sap->sin_family; > + ad.u.net.dport = sap->sin_port; > + ad.u.net.v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr; > + > + rc = smk_access_log(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } else { > sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET; > rc = 0; > @@ -1656,6 +1780,23 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) > } > Now this is tricky. You'll get an audit record for single-label hosts, but not for those that use CIPSO. The former is good, the latter is bad. > > /** > + * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm > + * @shp : the object > + * @access : access requested > + * > + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access) > +{ > + char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id; > + return smk_curacc_log(ssp, access, &ad); > +} > + > +/** > * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm > * @shp: the object > * @shmflg: access requested > @@ -1664,11 +1805,10 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) > */ > static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1680,7 +1820,6 @@ static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) > */ > static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) > { > - char *ssp; > int may; > > switch (cmd) { > @@ -1703,9 +1842,7 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) > default: > return -EINVAL; > } > - > - ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1719,11 +1856,10 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) > static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, > int shmflg) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1765,6 +1901,23 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) > } > > /** > + * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem > + * @sma : the object > + * @access : access requested > + * > + * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access) > +{ > + char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id; > + return smk_curacc_log(ssp, access, &ad); > +} > + > +/** > * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem > * @sma: the object > * @semflg: access requested > @@ -1773,11 +1926,10 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) > */ > static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1789,7 +1941,6 @@ static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) > */ > static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) > { > - char *ssp; > int may; > > switch (cmd) { > @@ -1818,8 +1969,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > - return smk_curacc(ssp, may); > + return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1836,9 +1986,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) > static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, > unsigned nsops, int alter) > { > - char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma); > - > - return smk_curacc(ssp, MAY_READWRITE); > + return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1880,6 +2028,23 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq) > } > > /** > + * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq > + * @msq : the msq > + * @access : access requested > + * > + * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise > + */ > +static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access) > +{ > + char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > + > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id; > + return smk_curacc_log(msp, access, &ad); > +} > + > +/** > * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue > * @msq: the object > * @msqflg: access requested > @@ -1888,11 +2053,10 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq) > */ > static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) > { > - char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > int may; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); > - return smk_curacc(msp, may); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1904,7 +2068,6 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) > */ > static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) > { > - char *msp; > int may; > > switch (cmd) { > @@ -1926,8 +2089,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) > return -EINVAL; > } > > - msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > - return smk_curacc(msp, may); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1941,11 +2103,10 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) > static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > int msqflg) > { > - char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > - int rc; > + int may; > > - rc = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); > - return smk_curacc(msp, rc); > + may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may); > } > > /** > @@ -1961,9 +2122,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) > { > - char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq); > - > - return smk_curacc(msp, MAY_READWRITE); > + return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1976,10 +2135,13 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, > static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag) > { > char *isp = ipp->security; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > int may; > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); > + ad.u.ipc_id = ipp->id; > > may = smack_flags_to_may(flag); > - return smk_curacc(isp, may); > + return smk_curacc_log(isp, may, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -2238,8 +2400,12 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, > { > struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock); > struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > - return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_READWRITE); > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; > + return smk_access_log(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), > + MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -2254,8 +2420,12 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) > { > struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock); > struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other); > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > - return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE); > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; > + return smk_access_log(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), > + MAY_WRITE, &ad); > } > > /** > @@ -2370,6 +2540,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > char smack[SMK_LABELLEN]; > char *csp; > int rc; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6) > return 0; > @@ -2388,13 +2559,17 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > > netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); > > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); > + ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; > + ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif; > + ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad, NULL); > /* > * Receiving a packet requires that the other end > * be able to write here. Read access is not required. > * This is the simplist possible security model > * for networking. > */ > - rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_access_log(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); > if (rc != 0) > netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); > return rc; > @@ -2642,6 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, > const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm) > { > struct key *keyp; > + struct common_audit_data ad; > > keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); > if (keyp == NULL) > @@ -2657,8 +2833,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, > */ > if (cred->security == NULL) > return -EACCES; > + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KEY); > + ad.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial; > + ad.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description; > > - return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE); > + return smk_access_log(cred->security, keyp->security, > + MAY_READWRITE, &ad); > } > #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ > > diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c > index e03a7e1..f141d31 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c > +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c > @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum smk_inos { > SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */ > SMK_NETLBLADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */ > SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */ > + SMK_LOGGING = 10, /* logging */ > }; > > /* > @@ -1192,6 +1193,71 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = { > }; > > /** > + * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging > + * @filp: file pointer, not actually used > + * @buf: where to put the result > + * @cn: maximum to send along > + * @ppos: where to start > + * > + * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate > + */ > +static ssize_t smk_read_logging(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, > + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + char temp[32]; > + ssize_t rc; > + > + if (*ppos != 0) > + return 0; > + > + sprintf(temp, "%d\n", > + log_policy.log_denied + log_policy.log_accepted*2); > + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); > + return rc; > +} > + > +/** > + * smk_write_logging - write() for /smack/logging > + * @file: file pointer, not actually used > + * @buf: where to get the data from > + * @count: bytes sent > + * @ppos: where to start > + * > + * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate > + */ > +static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + char temp[32]; > + int i; > + > + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + temp[count] = '\0'; > + > + if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) > + return -EINVAL; > + if (i < 0 || i > 3) > + return -EINVAL; > + log_policy.log_denied = i & 1; > + log_policy.log_accepted = (i & 2) >> 1 ; > Again, bits in a integer. > + return count; > +} > + > + > + > +static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = { > + .read = smk_read_logging, > + .write = smk_write_logging, > +}; > +/** > * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock > * @sb: the empty superblock > * @data: unused > @@ -1221,6 +1287,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > {"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > [SMK_ONLYCAP] = > {"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + [SMK_LOGGING] = > + {"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > /* last one */ {""} > }; > > > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/