Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755755AbZGBOG3 (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Jul 2009 10:06:29 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1753270AbZGBOGW (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Jul 2009 10:06:22 -0400 Received: from acsinet12.oracle.com ([141.146.126.234]:31761 "EHLO acsinet12.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752988AbZGBOGV convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Jul 2009 10:06:21 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <87cb4d6e-dbfe-497b-b651-9b912dc3fbc8@default> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2009 07:03:46 -0700 (PDT) From: Dan Magenheimer To: Pavel Machek , Jeremy Fitzhardinge Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, npiggin@suse.de, chris.mason@oracle.com, kurt.hackel@oracle.com, dave.mccracken@oracle.com, Avi Kivity , Rik van Riel , alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Rusty Russell , Martin Schwidefsky , akpm@osdl.org, Marcelo Tosatti , Balbir Singh , tmem-devel@oss.oracle.com, sunil.mushran@oracle.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, Himanshu Raj , Keir Fraser Subject: RE: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux In-Reply-To: <20090702063813.GA18157@elf.ucw.cz> X-Priority: 3 X-Mailer: Oracle Beehive Extensions for Outlook 1.5.1.2 (306040) [OL 9.0.0.6627] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=Windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT X-Source-IP: abhmt009.oracle.com [141.146.116.18] X-Auth-Type: Internal IP X-CT-RefId: str=0001.0A090203.4A4CBE61.0005:SCFSTAT5015188,ss=1,fgs=0 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1172 Lines: 30 OK, OK, I give up. I will ensure all code for shared pools is removed from the next version of the patch. Though for future reference, I am interested in what problems it has other than "just" security (offlist if you want). > -----Original Message----- > From: Pavel Machek [mailto:pavel@ucw.cz] > > > > Yeah, a shared namespace of accessible objects is an entirely > > > new thing > > > in the Xen universe. I would also drop Xen support until > > > there's a good > > > security story about how they can be used. > > > > While I agree that the security is not bulletproof, I wonder > > if this position might be a bit extreme. Certainly, the NSA > > should not turn on tmem in a cluster, but that doesn't mean that > > nobody should be allowed to. I really suspect that there are > > This has more problems than "just" security, and yes, security should > be really solved at design time... > > Pavel -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/