Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753760AbZIXAaH (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Sep 2009 20:30:07 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1753549AbZIXAaE (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Sep 2009 20:30:04 -0400 Received: from smtp231.iad.emailsrvr.com ([207.97.245.231]:39153 "EHLO smtp231.iad.emailsrvr.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753182AbZIXA3b (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Sep 2009 20:29:31 -0400 From: Oren Laadan To: Andrew Morton Cc: Linus Torvalds , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Serge Hallyn , Ingo Molnar , Pavel Emelyanov Subject: [PATCH v18 59/80] c/r: capabilities: define checkpoint and restore fns Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 19:51:39 -0400 Message-Id: <1253749920-18673-60-git-send-email-orenl@librato.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.6.0.4 In-Reply-To: <1253749920-18673-1-git-send-email-orenl@librato.com> References: <1253749920-18673-1-git-send-email-orenl@librato.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 9915 Lines: 326 From: Serge E. Hallyn [ Andrew: I am punting on dealing with the subsystem cooperation issues in this version, in favor of trying to get LSM issues straightened out ] An application checkpoint image will store capability sets (and the bounding set) as __u64s. Define checkpoint and restart functions to translate between those and kernel_cap_t's. Define a common function do_capset_tocred() which applies capability set changes to a passed-in struct cred. The restore function uses do_capset_tocred() to apply the restored capabilities to the struct cred being crafted, subject to the current task's (task executing sys_restart()) permissions. Changelog: Jun 09: Can't choose securebits or drop bounding set if file capabilities aren't compiled into the kernel. Also just store caps in __u32s (looks cleaner). Jun 01: Made the checkpoint and restore functions and the ckpt_hdr_capabilities struct more opaque to the rest of the c/r code, as suggested by Andrew Morgan, and using naming suggested by Oren. Jun 01: Add commented BUILD_BUG_ON() to point out that the current implementation depends on 64-bit capabilities. (Andrew Morgan and Alexey Dobriyan). May 28: add helpers to c/r securebits Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn --- include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++ include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h | 11 +++ kernel/capability.c | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/commoncap.c | 19 +---- 4 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index c302110..3a74655 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -568,6 +568,12 @@ extern int capable(int cap); struct dentry; extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); +struct cred; +int apply_securebits(unsigned securebits, struct cred *new); +struct ckpt_capabilities; +int restore_capabilities(struct ckpt_capabilities *h, struct cred *new); +void checkpoint_capabilities(struct ckpt_capabilities *h, struct cred * cred); + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h index ef260a0..cb036e8 100644 --- a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h +++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum { CKPT_HDR_NS, CKPT_HDR_UTS_NS, CKPT_HDR_IPC_NS, + CKPT_HDR_CAPABILITIES, /* 201-299: reserved for arch-dependent */ @@ -192,6 +193,16 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_task { __u64 robust_futex_list; /* a __user ptr */ } __attribute__((aligned(8))); +/* Posix capabilities */ +struct ckpt_capabilities { + __u32 cap_i_0, cap_i_1; /* inheritable set */ + __u32 cap_p_0, cap_p_1; /* permitted set */ + __u32 cap_e_0, cap_e_1; /* effective set */ + __u32 cap_b_0, cap_b_1; /* bounding set */ + __u32 securebits; + __u32 padding; +} __attribute__((aligned(8))); + /* namespaces */ struct ckpt_hdr_task_ns { struct ckpt_hdr h; diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 4e17041..4f58454 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include "cred-internals.h" @@ -217,6 +219,45 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr) return ret; } +static int do_capset_tocred(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted, struct cred *new) +{ + int ret; + + ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(), + effective, inheritable, permitted); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* + * for checkpoint-restart, do we want to wait until end of restart? + * not sure we care */ + audit_log_capset(current->pid, new, current_cred()); + + return 0; +} + +static int do_capset(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + struct cred *new; + int ret; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = do_capset_tocred(effective, inheritable, permitted, new); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + return commit_creds(new); + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return ret; +} + /** * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and @@ -240,7 +281,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; unsigned i, tocopy; kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; - struct cred *new; int ret; pid_t pid; @@ -271,23 +311,125 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) i++; } - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; + return do_capset(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted); - ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(), - &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES +int apply_securebits(unsigned securebits, struct cred *new) +{ + if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) + & (new->securebits ^ securebits)) /*[1]*/ + || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~securebits)) /*[2]*/ + || (securebits & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ + || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP, + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ + /* + * [1] no changing of bits that are locked + * [2] no unlocking of locks + * [3] no setting of unsupported bits + * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about + * the "sendmail capabilities bug") + */ + ) + /* cannot change a locked bit */ + return -EPERM; + new->securebits = securebits; + return 0; +} + +static void do_capbset_drop(struct cred *cred, int cap) +{ + cap_lower(cred->cap_bset, cap); +} + +static inline int restore_cap_bset(kernel_cap_t bset, struct cred *cred) +{ + int i, may_dropbcap = capable(CAP_SETPCAP); + + for (i = 0; i < CAP_LAST_CAP; i++) { + if (cap_raised(bset, i)) + continue; + if (!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_bset, i)) + continue; + if (!may_dropbcap) + return -EPERM; + do_capbset_drop(cred, i); + } + + return 0; +} + +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ + +int apply_securebits(unsigned securebits, struct cred *new) +{ + /* settable securebits not supported */ + return 0; +} + +static inline int restore_cap_bset(kernel_cap_t bset, struct cred *cred) +{ + /* bounding sets not supported */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT +static int do_restore_caps(struct ckpt_capabilities *h, struct cred *cred) +{ + kernel_cap_t effective, inheritable, permitted, bset; + int ret; + + effective.cap[0] = h->cap_e_0; + effective.cap[1] = h->cap_e_1; + inheritable.cap[0] = h->cap_i_0; + inheritable.cap[1] = h->cap_i_1; + permitted.cap[0] = h->cap_p_0; + permitted.cap[1] = h->cap_p_1; + bset.cap[0] = h->cap_b_0; + bset.cap[1] = h->cap_b_1; + + ret = do_capset_tocred(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted, cred); if (ret < 0) - goto error; + return ret; + + ret = restore_cap_bset(bset, cred); + return ret; +} - audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred()); +void checkpoint_capabilities(struct ckpt_capabilities *h, struct cred * cred) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(CAP_LAST_CAP >= 64); + h->securebits = cred->securebits; + h->cap_i_0 = cred->cap_inheritable.cap[0]; + h->cap_i_1 = cred->cap_inheritable.cap[1]; + h->cap_p_0 = cred->cap_permitted.cap[0]; + h->cap_p_1 = cred->cap_permitted.cap[1]; + h->cap_e_0 = cred->cap_effective.cap[0]; + h->cap_e_1 = cred->cap_effective.cap[1]; + h->cap_b_0 = cred->cap_bset.cap[0]; + h->cap_b_1 = cred->cap_bset.cap[1]; +} - return commit_creds(new); +/* + * restore_capabilities: called by restore_creds() to set the + * restored capabilities (if permitted) in a new struct cred which + * will be attached at the end of the sys_restart(). + * struct cred *new is prepared by caller (using prepare_creds()) + * (and aborted by caller on error) + * return 0 on success, < 0 on error + */ +int restore_capabilities(struct ckpt_capabilities *h, struct cred *new) +{ + int ret = do_restore_caps(h, new); + + if (!ret) + ret = apply_securebits(h->securebits, new); -error: - abort_creds(new); return ret; } +#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */ /** * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index e3097c0..892815b 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -893,24 +893,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, * capability-based-privilege environment. */ case PR_SET_SECUREBITS: - error = -EPERM; - if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) - & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ - || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ - || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ - || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ - /* - * [1] no changing of bits that are locked - * [2] no unlocking of locks - * [3] no setting of unsupported bits - * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about - * the "sendmail capabilities bug") - */ - ) - /* cannot change a locked bit */ + error = apply_securebits(arg2, new); + if (error) goto error; - new->securebits = arg2; goto changed; case PR_GET_SECUREBITS: -- 1.6.0.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/