Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752466AbZI1QER (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Sep 2009 12:04:17 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751599AbZI1QEQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Sep 2009 12:04:16 -0400 Received: from fxip-0047f.externet.hu ([88.209.222.127]:47825 "EHLO pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751295AbZI1QEQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Sep 2009 12:04:16 -0400 To: Andreas Dilger CC: miklos@szeredi.hu, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, linux@treblig.org, agruen@suse.de, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-reply-to: <20090928152128.GA3384@webber.adilger.int> (message from Andreas Dilger on Mon, 28 Sep 2009 09:21:28 -0600) Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfs: new O_NODE open flag References: <200909250223.58664.agruen@suse.de> <20090925123747.GA31228@gallifrey> <9988.1253899252@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <20090925183523.GA6065@gallifrey> <19645.1253913514@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <20090928152128.GA3384@webber.adilger.int> Message-Id: From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2009 18:04:10 +0200 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1259 Lines: 37 On Mon, 28 Sep 2009, Andreas Dilger wrote: > On Sep 28, 2009 12:25 +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > > BTW I just checked, and it is possible to re-open or promote an fd > > opened with O_NODE like this: > > > > char tmp[64]; > > > > fd = open(filename, O_NODE | O_NOACCESS); > > /* ... */ > > sprintf(tmp, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd); > > fd_rw = open(tmp, O_RDWR); > > > > Now fd_rw is guaranteed to refer to the same inode as fd. > > It seems very unpleasant to require applications using O_NODE to > reopen files using /proc. The point of the above example was that reopening a file descriptor with upgraded (or downgraded) access mode is even now possible. Which either means: a) the current permission model under /proc/PID/fd has a security hole (which Jamie is worried about) b) we can safely implement this with by changing openat() semantics, or even with a new reopen() syscall I'm not too worried about the security aspect of this, but it's something to keep in mind. Thanks, Miklos -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/