Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756956AbZJDMxz (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2009 08:53:55 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756098AbZJDMxd (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2009 08:53:33 -0400 Received: from wine.ocn.ne.jp ([122.1.235.145]:60082 "EHLO smtp.wine.ocn.ne.jp" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754474AbZJDMxb (ORCPT ); Sun, 4 Oct 2009 08:53:31 -0400 Message-Id: <20091004125327.457898741@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> References: <20091004124946.788396453@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> User-Agent: quilt/0.46-1 Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2009 21:49:48 +0900 From: Tetsuo Handa To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Tetsuo Handa Subject: [TOMOYO #16 02/25] LSM: Add security_path_chroot(). Content-Disposition: inline; filename=lsm-add-chroot-hook.patch Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3461 Lines: 108 This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations. This hook is used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa --- fs/open.c | 3 +++ include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ security/capability.c | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+) --- security-testing-2.6.orig/fs/open.c +++ security-testing-2.6/fs/open.c @@ -587,6 +587,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __use error = -EPERM; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) goto dput_and_out; + error = security_path_chroot(&path); + if (error) + goto dput_and_out; set_fs_root(current->fs, &path); error = 0; --- security-testing-2.6.orig/include/linux/security.h +++ security-testing-2.6/include/linux/security.h @@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt * @uid contains new owner's ID. * @gid contains new group's ID. * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_chroot: + * Check for permission to change root directory. + * @path contains the path structure. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_readlink: * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link. @@ -1503,6 +1507,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*path_chmod) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); + int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path); #endif int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode); @@ -2970,6 +2975,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *ol int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); +int security_path_chroot(struct path *path); #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { @@ -3031,6 +3037,11 @@ static inline int security_path_chown(st { return 0; } + +static inline int security_path_chroot(struct path *path) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS --- security-testing-2.6.orig/security/capability.c +++ security-testing-2.6/security/capability.c @@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static int cap_path_chown(struct path *p { return 0; } + +static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root) +{ + return 0; +} #endif static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -990,6 +995,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot); #endif set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); --- security-testing-2.6.orig/security/security.c +++ security-testing-2.6/security/security.c @@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ int security_path_chown(struct path *pat return 0; return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid); } + +int security_path_chroot(struct path *path) +{ + return security_ops->path_chroot(path); +} #endif int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) -- -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/