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From: Mike Frysinger <vapier.adi@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2009 11:43:20 -0400
Message-ID: <8bd0f97a0910160843i1e95c543o842f91892f681214@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Uclinux-dist-devel] [PATCH] mm/nommu.c: Fix improperly call of 
	security API in mmap
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, graff.yang@gmail.com,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
       uclinux-dist-devel@blackfin.uclinux.org, gyang@blackfin.uclinux.org,
       akpm@linux-foundation.org
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On Fri, Oct 16, 2009 at 11:14, David Howells wrote:
> Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> wrote:
>> I really don't like seeing such irrelevant (that's not the right word,
>> but I can't think what is) ifdefs creeping down into the security
>> layer as LSM authors are likely to mess them up in the future.  I'd
>> probably rather see the addr_only argument changed into a flags field.
>>  One for addr_only and one flag for not_addr.  The nommu case could
>> just set the not_addr flag and it's obvious how the LSMs (or
>> capabilities if !CONFIG_SECURITY) should handle it, also works if some
>> other future need arises...
>
> A better way still, might be to deny the possibility of CONFIG_SECURITY if
> CONFIG_MMU=n.  After all, security is sort of pointless when a userspace
> program can just edit the kernel at a whim.

except for MPU users, and arent some security restrictions useful when
talking about networked daemons ?
-mike
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