Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751475Ab0AALlu (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Jan 2010 06:41:50 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751267Ab0AALlu (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Jan 2010 06:41:50 -0500 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:55986 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751236Ab0AALlt (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Jan 2010 06:41:49 -0500 To: daw-news@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: RFC: disablenetwork facility. (v4) References: <20091229050114.GC14362@heat> From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 03:41:43 -0800 In-Reply-To: (David Wagner's message of "Wed\, 30 Dec 2009 07\:24\:11 +0000 \(UTC\)") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.11 (Gnus v5.11) Emacs/22.2 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-XM-SPF: eid=;;;mid=;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=76.21.114.89;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 76.21.114.89 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on in02.mta.xmission.com); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1620 Lines: 37 daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) writes: > Eric W. Biederman wrote: >>The problem with the disable_network semantics you want >>is that they allow you to perform a denial of service attack >>on privileged users. An unprivileged DOS attack is unsuitable >>for a general purpose feature in a general purpose kernel. > > I'm not persuaded yet. I won't try hard to persuade you if you drop me off the cc list. > When you talk about DOS, let's be a bit more precise. disablenetwork > gives a way to deny setuid programs access to the network. It's not a > general-purpose DOS; it's denying access to the network only. And the > network is fundamentally unreliable. No security-critical mechanism > should be relying upon the availability of the network. The audit daemon should not rely on netlink? > So while I certainly can't rule out the possibility that disablenetwork > might introduce minor issues, I think there are fundamental reasons to > be skeptical that disablenetwork will introduce serious new security > problems. For me the case is simple. I have seen several plausible sounding scenarios that get most of the way there. I know I am stupid when it comes to security and that people exploiting problems are going to be looking harder than I will. Therefore I think there is a reasonable chance this will introduce a security hole for someone. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/