Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755255Ab0AWMEJ (ORCPT ); Sat, 23 Jan 2010 07:04:09 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1755189Ab0AWMEH (ORCPT ); Sat, 23 Jan 2010 07:04:07 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:62274 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753614Ab0AWMEE (ORCPT ); Sat, 23 Jan 2010 07:04:04 -0500 Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2010 07:03:01 -0500 From: "Frank Ch. Eigler" To: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds , Steven Rostedt , Fr??d??ric Weisbecker , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Li Zefan , Tom Zanussi , systemtap@sources.redhat.com, dle-develop@lists.sourceforge.net, Andrew Morton , Stephen Rothwell , Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli , Peter Zijlstra , Peter Zijlstra , LKML , linux-next@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , utrace-devel@redhat.com, Thomas Gleixner Subject: Re: linux-next: add utrace tree Message-ID: <20100123120301.GD7828@redhat.com> References: <20100122111747.3c224dfd.sfr@canb.auug.org.au> <20100121163004.8779bd69.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <20100121163145.7e958c3f.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <20100122005147.GD22003@redhat.com> <20100121170541.7425ff10.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <20100122012516.GE22003@redhat.com> <20100122022255.GF22003@redhat.com> <20100123060401.GB19399@elte.hu> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20100123060401.GB19399@elte.hu> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2.2i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1683 Lines: 39 Hi - On Sat, Jan 23, 2010 at 07:04:01AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > [...] Also, if any systemtap person is interested in helping us > create a more generic filter engine out of the current ftrace filter > engine (which is really a precursor of a safe, sandboxed in-kernel > script engine), that would be excellent as well. [...] Thank you for the invitation. > More could be done - a simple C-like set of function perhaps - some minimal > per probe local variable state, etc. (perhaps even looping as well, with a > limit on number of predicament executions per filter invocation.) Yes, at some point when such bytecode intepreter gets rich enough, one may not need the translated-to-C means of running scripts. > ( _Such_ a facility, could then perhaps be used to allow applications access > to safe syscall sandboxing techniques: i.e. a programmable seccomp concept > in essence, controlled via ASCII space filter expressions [...] > IMHO that would be a superior concept for security modules too [...] > > [...] specific functionality with an immediately visible upside, > with no need for opaque hooks. This OTOH seem like rather a stretch. If one claims that "opaque hooks" are bad, so instead have hooks that jump not to auditable C code but an bytecode interpreter? And have the bytecodes be uploaded from userspace? How is this supposed to produce "transparency" from the kernel/hook point of view? - FChE -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/