Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Thu, 18 Apr 2002 14:36:49 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Thu, 18 Apr 2002 14:36:48 -0400 Received: from science.horizon.com ([192.35.100.1]:1089 "HELO science.horizon.com") by vger.kernel.org with SMTP id ; Thu, 18 Apr 2002 14:36:47 -0400 Date: 18 Apr 2002 18:36:39 -0000 Message-ID: <20020418183639.20946.qmail@science.horizon.com> From: linux@horizon.com To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: SSE related security hole Cc: linux@horizon.com Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Um, people here seem to be assuming that, in the absence of MMX, fninit *doesn't* leak information. I thought it was well-known to just clear (set to all-ones) the tag register and not alter the actual floating-point registers. Thus, it seems quite feasible to reset the tag word with FLDENV and store out the FPU registers, even on an 80387. Isn't this the same security hole? Shouldn't there be 8 FLDZ instructions (or equivalent) in the processor state initialization? - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/