Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933185Ab0BPWpl (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Feb 2010 17:45:41 -0500 Received: from e31.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.149]:50918 "EHLO e31.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933263Ab0BPWpi (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Feb 2010 17:45:38 -0500 From: Serge Hallyn To: serue@us.ibm.com Cc: Greg KH , rsc@swtch.com, Ashwin Ganti , ericvh@gmail.com, devel@driverdev.osuosl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ron Minnich Subject: [PATCH 6/8] p9auth: do groups Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 16:44:59 -0600 Message-Id: <1266360301-30081-6-git-send-email-serue@us.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.6.3.3 In-Reply-To: <1266360301-30081-1-git-send-email-serue@us.ibm.com> References: <1266360301-30081-1-git-send-email-serue@us.ibm.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 5724 Lines: 202 From: Serge E. Hallyn A p9auth capability used to be 'old_uid@new_uid@random_string'. Now it is 'old_uid@new_uid@new_gid@num_groups@g_1@...@g_n@random_string'. After using the capability, credentials will be: suid = old_uid; sgid = old_gid; uid = euid = fsuid = new_uid gid = egid = fsgid = new_gid auxiliary groups = g_1, g_2, ..., g_n Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Greg KH cc: rsc@swtch.com Cc: Ashwin Ganti Cc: ericvh@gmail.com Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ron Minnich --- drivers/staging/p9auth/p9auth.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/p9auth/p9auth.c b/drivers/staging/p9auth/p9auth.c index 50447d4..e94c4fe 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/p9auth/p9auth.c +++ b/drivers/staging/p9auth/p9auth.c @@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ static int cap_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) struct id_set { char *source_user, *target_user; - char *randstr; uid_t old_uid, new_uid; + gid_t new_gid; + unsigned int ngroups; + struct group_info *newgroups; char *full; /* The full entry which must be freed */ }; @@ -180,7 +182,8 @@ struct id_set { */ static int parse_user_capability(char *s, struct id_set *set) { - char *tmpu; + char *tmp, *tmpu; + int i, ret; /* * break the supplied string into tokens with @ as the @@ -192,18 +195,45 @@ static int parse_user_capability(char *s, struct id_set *set) if (!tmpu) return -ENOMEM; + ret = -EINVAL; set->source_user = strsep(&tmpu, "@"); set->target_user = strsep(&tmpu, "@"); - set->randstr = tmpu; - if (!set->source_user || !set->target_user || !set->randstr) { - kfree(set->full); - return -EINVAL; - } + tmp = strsep(&tmpu, "@"); + if (!set->source_user || !set->target_user || !tmp) + goto out; set->new_uid = simple_strtoul(set->target_user, NULL, 0); set->old_uid = simple_strtoul(set->source_user, NULL, 0); + set->new_gid = simple_strtoul(tmp, NULL, 0); - return 0; + tmp = strsep(&tmpu, "@"); + if (!tmp) + goto out; + if (sscanf(tmp, "%d", &set->ngroups) != 1 || set->ngroups < 0) + goto out; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + set->newgroups = groups_alloc(set->ngroups); + if (!set->newgroups) + goto out; + + ret = -EINVAL; + for (i = 0; i < set->ngroups; i++) { + gid_t g; + + tmp = strsep(&tmpu, "@"); + if (!tmp || sscanf(tmp, "%d", &g) != 1) { + groups_free(set->newgroups); + goto out; + } + GROUP_AT(set->newgroups, i) = g; + } + + ret = 0; + +out: + kfree(set->full); + return ret; } static int grant_id(struct id_set *set) @@ -230,8 +260,13 @@ static int grant_id(struct id_set *set) if (!new) return -ENOMEM; - ret = cred_setresuid(new, set->new_uid, set->new_uid, set->new_uid, - CRED_SETID_FORCE); + ret = set_groups(new, set->newgroups); + if (!ret) + ret = cred_setresgid(new, set->new_gid, set->new_gid, + set->new_gid, CRED_SETID_FORCE); + if (!ret) + ret = cred_setresuid(new, set->new_uid, set->new_uid, + set->new_uid, CRED_SETID_FORCE); if (ret == 0) commit_creds(new); else @@ -260,12 +295,12 @@ static int add_caphash_entry(struct cap_dev *dev, char *user_buf, size_t count) return 0; } -static int use_caphash_entry(struct cap_dev *dev, char *user_buf) +static int use_caphash_entry(struct cap_dev *dev, char *ubuf) { struct cap_node *node; struct id_set set; - int ret, len, found = 0; - char *tohash, *hashed; + int ret, found = 0; + char *hashed = NULL, *sep; struct list_head *pos; if (!cap_devices[0].head) @@ -273,37 +308,30 @@ static int use_caphash_entry(struct cap_dev *dev, char *user_buf) if (list_empty(&(cap_devices[0].head->list))) return -EINVAL; - ret = parse_user_capability(user_buf, &set); + ret = parse_user_capability(ubuf, &set); if (ret) return ret; - /* hash the string user1@user2 with randstr as the key */ - len = strlen(set.source_user) + strlen(set.target_user) + 1; - /* src, @, len, \0 */ - tohash = kzalloc(len+1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tohash) { - kfree(set.full); - return -ENOMEM; + /* + * hash the string user1@user2@ngrp@grp... with randstr as the key + * XXX is there any vulnerability we're opening ourselves up to by + * not rebuilding the string from its components? + */ + sep = strrchr(ubuf, '@'); + if (sep) { + char *rand = sep + 1; + *sep = '\0'; + hashed = cap_hash(ubuf, strlen(ubuf), rand, strlen(rand)); + } + if (NULL == hashed) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } - strcat(tohash, set.source_user); - strcat(tohash, "@"); - strcat(tohash, set.target_user); - printk(KERN_ALERT "the source user is %s \n", set.source_user); - printk(KERN_ALERT "the target user is %s \n", set.target_user); - hashed = cap_hash(tohash, len, set.randstr, strlen(set.randstr)); - kfree(set.full); - kfree(tohash); - if (NULL == hashed) - return -EFAULT; /* Change the process's uid if the hash is present in the * list of hashes */ list_for_each(pos, &(cap_devices->head->list)) { - /* - * Change the user id of the process if the hashes - * match - */ node = list_entry(pos, struct cap_node, list); if (0 == memcmp(hashed, node->data, CAP_NODE_SIZE)) { ret = grant_id(&set); @@ -323,6 +351,7 @@ static int use_caphash_entry(struct cap_dev *dev, char *user_buf) ret = -EFAULT; } out: + put_group_info(set.newgroups); kfree(hashed); return ret; } -- 1.6.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/